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Abstract
Climate change will be most apparent in alterations to the hydrologic system—
shifts in movement, variations in extremes—thereby defining many resource disputes in
the coming decades. Water is a boundaryless resource; as its hydrologic patterns shift
within and without borders, so too will preexisting agreements on its use and allocation.
The question for transboundary water agreements is: how can agreements both satisfy
parties’ needs and account for future uncertainties of climate-induced changes to their
basins’ hydrologic systems?
From examining literature and water agreements, this thesis develops a list of
provisions identified as foundational to resiliency in transboundary water agreements.
The context of Central Asia provides a case study for determining the effectiveness of
provisions in fostering resiliency, ultimately concluding that, if the implementation of an
agreement is weak, then the impact of provisions is negated. The value of an agreement‘s
content is secondary to the resilient action resulting from it. Future research is needed to
understand how provisions can be used to promote or strengthen agreement
implementation.
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Section One
“Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce anything;
Scarce anything can be had in exchange for it.”
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

Introduction
As climate change forces shifts from historic hydrologic patterns, the question of
resiliency within preexisting water agreements echoes in the nexus of water and conflict.
There is a strong argument for creating provisions that withstand the impacts and
changes, foreseen and unforeseen, within transboundary river agreements. How can
agreements both satisfy parties' current needs and account for future uncertainties? Can
provisions within an agreement be a solution for mitigating international conflict caused
by climate change? The hypothesis and theory of change of this thesis is that if riparians
have mechanisms, or provisions, for adaptation within the overarching agreement
framework, then transboundary river agreements will have the resiliency to withstand the
impacts of climate change. The research presented below considers water and conflict,
water and cooperation, and water and climate change in order to extract from the
literature a list of provisions identified as important to resiliency in water agreements.
1

The list of provisions is then applied to two Central Asian water treaties for empirical
evaluation of the effectiveness of the provisions. Finally, a discussion of the findings
articulates the implied conditionality of implementation for provisions to have an impact
on resiliency.

Background
Rivers are the scoliotic backbone of life. Watercourses carry the minerals and
microorganisms critical to healthy ecological systems, while bending geography to the
demands of force and gravity. Fertile river valleys accelerated the evolution and
interdependence of flora and fauna. Humans then leveraged basin conditions for hunting
and later agriculture, flourishing as a species to create cultures, societies, and
technologies that have since defined the great civilizations—such as Mesopotamia in the
Fertile Crescent, the Nile cities of Cairo and Alexandria, the canal-dependent
metropolitan of London, and even the modern cities of the American West.
Though carrying less than 0.3% of the world’s freshwater supply, rivers have
influenced humankind more so than any other water source. Culturally, rivers define
religion, festivals, and even language. Consider the Ganges, India’s mystic river and
home to the goddess Ganga, or the Jordan, the river of Christ’s baptism and start of his
evangelism. Economically, rivers have served as a link between peoples. Trade along
rivers began as early as 3000 BC in Mesopotamia, building bridges between different
civilizations and creating networks for the exchange of goods and knowledge (Whipps,
2008). Rivers provided the highways for exploration, opening the great continental
expanses of North America for French traders in fur-laden canoes and the heart of Africa
2

for David Livingstone. As Henry Thoreau wrote, “[Rivers] are the constant lure, when
they flow by our doors, to distant enterprise and adventure, and, by a natural impulse, the
dwellers on their banks will at length accompany their currents to the lowlands of the
globe, or explore at their invitation the interior of continents” (Thoreau, 2012, 92).
Considering the role of rivers in both the creation and connection of civilizations,
it is of little surprise that watercourses have defined international relationships throughout
the past seven thousand years. The first known international treaty of any kind was a
water treaty in 2500 BC between two Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma to end a
dispute along the Tigris River (UN, 2014). In the 4500 years since, thousands of water
treaties have been implemented in cases of disputes—the Food and Agricultural
Organization estimates over 3600 water treaties since 805 AD (FAO, qtd. In UN, 2014).
More than 150 of these treaties have been signed in the last fifty years alone (UN, 2014).
Of course, water treaties have developed out of a necessity for cooperation: the world has
263 transboundary basins falling within 145 nations, and 21 of those nations lay
exclusively within shared basins (UN, 2014).
Yet, for how central watercourses have been to human development, our mastery
over rivers remains as tumultuous as their characteristic waters. Water is legally defined
as a fugitive resource, meaning that it lacks a fixed location and must be captured to be
used. It heeds no boundaries without a stern and engineered hand. As such, we have
diverted, dyked, dammed, and damned rivers to control water. Enduring civilizations, like
Mesopotamia, China, and industrial Europe, responded to water challenges by redefining
water management through innovative systems, whereas societies unable to create,
maintain, and/or grow waterworks declined and collapsed. As one author summarized:
3

“…the economic productiveness and political equilibrium of today’s
advanced societies depends critically upon the robustness, security, and
continuous innovative development of an interlinked array of giant dams,
electric power plants, aqueducts, reservoirs, pumps, distribution pipes,
sanitary sewage systems, wastewater treatment facilities, irrigation canals,
drainage systems, and levees...” (Solomon, 2010, 368)
In other words, it was through highly-refined and engineered infrastructure that societies
established mastery of rivers. The technologies of control created short-term stability—
but was it in exchange for long-term climate instability?
This micro-managerial control has a cost. Consider the Aral Sea, for example, the
USSR’s “hydraulic Chernobyl” (Solomon, 2010, 377). The Soviet effort to transform the
steppes into a cotton-producing belt was blasé reengineering of an arid ecosystem. By
diverting the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya (known as the Jaxartes and Oxus of ancient
history), the Soviets reduced the world’s fourth-largest freshwater lake into two small,
saline lakes. Today, the steppes face a return to their aridity: the exposed lakebed creates
a salty dust bowl effect on the cotton fields, while the stunted hydrological system makes
for hotter summers and colder winters with less rainfall, less snowpack, and less runoff
into the rivers. The result is a seemingly irreversible climate change.
Climate change brings us to the sham of humanity’s so-called mastery of rivers, in
that our advancements took for granted water’s renewability. An IUCN report phrased
the concept as “an assumption of ecosystem stationarity,” meaning that water
management was designed on the historical record of a basin’s hydrologic system
(Barchiesi et al., 2014, 11). Civilizations aborted river outflow without questing the
continuation of inflow. We established cities—giant cities, like Los Angeles and
Mumbai—on the final drops of imported rivers. And we know now that our assurances
4

were unsustainable, as the means to mastery was also its undoing: it limited adaptability
and exacerbated climate change. First, increasing the technical control over natural
systems limited societies’ adaptability—dams built to provide water in the dry season
ballooned nearby populations accordingly; in-house taps created endless flows of
freshwater; subsidized and expanding irrigation networks slowly unsynced demand to
natural supply. Second, the very technologies that provided the power for control, like the
coal that produced energy and the toxic byproducts of infrastructure development, were
the technologies that enabled climate change.
The impacts of climate change will be evident in multiple arenas, such as the
well-publicized threat to polar bears and the increased frequency of “100 Year” storms.
However, few natural systems will be impacted as significantly as the hydrologic cycle.
Climate change is defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as “a
statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate or in its
variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer),” which “may
be due in natural processes or external forces or to persistent anthropogenic changes in
the composition of the atmosphere or in land use” (IPCC, 2001, qtd. in Barchiesi et al.,
2014). For rivers, these persistent changes will be felt from source to termination. As
pictured in Image 1.1, the amount of river water, or flow, will be impacted by increased
glacier melt, as well as shifts to rainfall instead of snow, which will change the
seasonality of high flows and low flows. Precipitation changes will also increase erosion,
siltation, and landslides, while temperature changes increase evaporation from water
bodies. For industries and cities built within the historical basin conditions, changes will
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have direct impacts on their livelihoods, and will be further exacerbated by impacts felt in
aquifers and wetlands.
Image 1.1. Climate Change in a Typical River Basin (Barchiesi et al., 2014, 12)

Recent decades have brought awareness of the human impact on climate and
ecosystems, and especially the vulnerability of freshwater systems. Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment experts predict that 25% of freshwater supply may already be
unsustainably consumed. This stress will worsen in coming years, as seen in Image 1.2
below. Chronic shortages cannot be fixed by moving heavy loads of water, but must be
addressed watershed by watershed—yet must also satisfy the political nature of the
world’s 261 transnational river basins (Solomon, 2010, 376). Borders, populations,
6

historical use, and preexisting agreements all contribute to the politicization of
watersheds.
Image 1.2. Water Stress by Country (World Resources Institute)

Consider again the Aral Sea crisis. Despite multiple layers of international,
interstate, and national agreements and commitments to reverse the desiccation of the
basin, the Aral Sea continues to shrink. The water management and regional governance
has failed the environment and the social interdependence of the basin, as well as the long
term climatic implications. In other words, the current governing agreements have failed
both short- and long-term. The question, then, is not merely how to govern a watershed,
nor how to address the impacts of climate change. Rather, the question is how to create
agreements that can satisfy the needs of parties today, while also considering the future
7

uncertainties of climate-induced changes to basins’ hydrological systems. And,
underscoring this orientation is the question of how to ensure resiliency in the agreement,
so that it can withstand the pressures of climate change and promote cooperation between
riparians.

Resiliency and Water Agreements
The future of water disputes has been heralded as an apocalyptic certainty in
media, entertainment, and even academic outlets. Ismail Serageldin, former chairman of
the World Commission for Water, said in 1995: “Many of the wars in this century were
about oil, but those of the next century will be over water.” Examples of water tensions
are seen in violent outbreaks around the world—Karachi, Pakistan; Cochabamba,
Bolivia; and Kenya, in what one author calls “the oddest report of water violence”
between monkeys and humans, in a conflict over water tankers that left eight primates
dead (Solomon, 2010, 371-372).
Yet, when stepping away from the fervor of fear, water war is impractical. It has
been, and continues to be, rare. Wolf (2003) found that 67.1% of riparian interactions are
cooperative, 27.7% of riparian interactions are neutral, and a mere 5.2% of riparian
interactions are conflictive. Similarly, though using different methodology, Kalbhenn and
Bernauer (2012) found that a mere 18.3% of interactions are conflictive.1 The nature of
water agreements seemingly rebuffs militarized escalation.

1

Both datasets include verbal hostilities as conflictive interactions.
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Jeuland (2017) wrote that “[t]here is ample evidence that river basin treaties are
remarkable in their resilience, even in some of the world’s most contentious locations,
providing effective mechanisms to resolve disputes.” The Indus River Commission has
survived two wars; the Mekong River Exchange continued technical meetings through
the Vietnam War; and Central Asia’s Cooperation on Transboundary Water Management
has lasted through several post-Soviet revolutions and coups. Water agreements have
been, overall, resilient. So, what is resiliency?
The theory of resiliency comes from the field of psychology, stemming from the
work of Emmy Werner in the 1970s and 80s. Werner worked with at-risk children, and
found that one-third did not exhibit the destructive behaviors of their peers or parents,
such as teenage pregnancies and substance abuse (Werner, 1982). Werner named this
group “resilient.” Resiliency theory focuses on positive capabilities, the “contextual,
social, and individual variables”, that disrupt negative trajectories towards risky
behaviors (Zimmerman, 2013). It emphasizes coping mechanisms amidst difficulties.
The application of resiliency theory to water treaties acknowledges the strengthbased foundation of resiliency. Werner’s “resilient” children exhibited actions, both
internal and external, that disrupted the path towards unhealthy, conflictive, and risky
behaviors. Transferring the theory to agreements, then, requires examination of the
actions, both internal and external, that an agreement can promote to disrupt the
trajectory towards failed implementation. Wolf (2007) and Brochmann (2012) found that
resiliency is tied to cooperative behavior elicited by a water treaty. Therefore, there is a
braided theme to extract regarding water agreements and resiliency: resiliency reduces
the likelihood of negative behavior; resiliency stems from cooperation in a watershed;
9

and cooperation comes from a successful water agreement. In other words, resiliency is
tied to positive riparian relations and agreement implementation.
But why pursue resiliency? Why not mere flexibility or sustainability? Although
the latter concepts are important traits within a resilient agreement, resiliency is a
worthwhile goal because of its broader encompassment of definitions. Resiliency theory
articulates the ability to “respond and recover” (Table 1.1 below) and even “thrive”
(Table 1.1) in times of crisis. Flexibility and sustainability are much narrower in scope,
implying the capabilities necessary to adapt, but not necessarily the capabilities to
flourish. In contrast, resiliency is an optimistic, positive, and forward-moving goal for
nations and communities to adopt. In the words of writer James Cascio, “Sustainability is
about survival. The goal of resilience is to thrive” (Cascio, n.d.).
Table 1.1: Selected Definitions of Community resiliency (Source: Crow, 2018)
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The question stemming from resiliency theory, then, and the discussion of
resiliency within a community, an agreement, or climate change, is: what are the aspects
of an agreement that promote resiliency? And how can those be capitalized upon to
strengthen conflict prevention in a future of heightened water shortages, stemming from
climate change?

Climate Change and Responses in Water Agreements
To understand how to promote resiliency in treaties, it is necessary to understand
what threatens to inhibit current water agreements. Climate change is a real and sizeable
threat. A growing body of scientific models and evidence provide blurry outlines of
clouded uncertainty, yet reinforce the changes that will, and have begun, to take place.
We do not know how it will reshape civilization’s relationship with rivers, though we
know it will. And as it modifies the hydrologic system, preexisting water agreements
must modify accordingly.
Solomon (2010) argues that society has not modified water use to climate change
pressures. He writes that modern societies tend to take one of four options to respond to
the looming impacts of climate change. The first option is to do nothing and wait until a
solution is found, such as genetically modified crops or gradual population reduction. The
second option is to be more efficient with water use through regulation or marketoriented methods. Already, this option has begun to be implemented in many places out
of necessity, such as in Israel where water scarcity has been monetized by an innovative
water industry. The third option is to divert huge amounts of water from wetlands to
drying lands. The final option is to drill deep into the Earth’s reserves and pump them
11

dry. The Ogallala Aquifer in the heartland of the U.S. is an example of draining
underground water reserves for contemporary prioritization of consumption.
In coincidental response to Solomon, Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) identify
four strategies for addressing climate change within agreements. The first strategy is
dubbed “ignoring uncertainty,” meaning the deliberate or unconscious denial of
uncertainty. The authors use the example of omitting a conflict resolution process from a
water treaty as a way of ignoring the risk of conflict (2014, 53). It is of little surprise that
this strategy, which echoes the warnings of Solomon above, is best avoided. The second
strategy, called the “complete contracts approach,” tries to create certainty in all
situations. This tongue-in-cheek “watertight agreement” removes any ambiguity (2014,
54). However, the rigidity of such a strategy inhibits flexibility when unforeseen
scenarios happen. The third strategy reduces the impacts of climate change by limiting
uncertainty. Actions such as transparent data, climate modelling, and engineering projects
are methods of mitigating future effects. On the continuum of successful strategies,
Drieschova and Eckstein rank this above the former option, yet caution against the
assumption that reducing uncertainty eliminates uncertainty (2014, 54). The fourth and
favorite strategy of Drieschova and Eckstein is called the “open-ended approach” (2014,
55). This strategy responds to climate change uncertainty by designing flexibility into
water management. Examples here include mutual assistance funds, indirect water
allocation, and feedback loops for design and operation (ibid). One of the strongest
advantages of the flexible approach is that riparians can adapt obligations to their shifting
natural restraints or advantages.
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It is plain that Solomon’s four options, and at least two of Drieschova and
Eckstein’s options, lack sustainability and even short-term feasibility. Solomon argued
that the answer to addressing the pressure of water scarcity is a paradigm shift, in which
water is seen as the new oil – “a precious resource that has to be consciously conserved,
efficiently used, and properly accounted for on the balance sheets across the breadth of
human activity, great and mundane” (Solomon, 2010, 383).
Both Solomon and Drieschova and Eckstein recognize that there is a need for
greater resiliency in and strengthening of water agreements. Agreements must modify to
the pressures of climate change. It is through this lens of modification that the concept of
provisions, or mechanisms within an agreement for particular eventualities, comes to the
forefront of relevant literature.

Introduction to Agreements
The concept of provisions hinges upon the foundations of agreements. The basic
principles of agreements create the foundation for discussing what additional scaffolding,
such as provisions, can be added to a water agreement. Though critically important in the
nexus of water and conflict, water agreements are—at their core—founded on the same
principles of any other agreement: interests and needs. Agreements are ratified when the
positions, interests, and/or needs of parties are satisfied to the degree where peace is
preferable to conflict. Often veiled behind positionality and its temerarious rhetoric are
parties' motivations, their needs and interests, which make for the substance of
meaningful negotiations. The classic example of sisters arguing over an orange illustrates
the purpose of understanding interests: two siblings fighting over an orange results in
13

their mother cutting it in half; one sister goes outside to eat the flesh, while the other
sister goes to the kitchen to zest the skin for a cake (Follett, 1995). Of course, had they
discussed their motivations for wanting the orange, each sister could have been fully
satisfied. Similarly, finding resolutions for complex disputes, such as a water conflict, is
still a matter of satisfying interests. Two riparians fighting over water may appear
unresolvable until examining interests reveals maneuverability. Exploring interests
allows parties to craft win-win solutions.
There are three overarching categories of interests: substantive, procedural, and
psychological (Moore, 2003, p. 75). Substantive interests are comprised of goods, such as
money, time, or natural resources like water and oil. Procedural interests are the
mechanisms through which the dispute is discussed and outcomes are implemented.
Agreeing to use the World Bank as a neutral mediator, or creating a path for resolving
future disputes, are procedural interests. Finally, psychological interests are emotional
and relational needs. In a transboundary context, the need for political face-saving, or for
trust in an upstream riparian, are psychological interests.
The combination of substantive, procedural, and psychological interests comprise
the reasons a party agrees to a treaty. When interests are satisfied, parties are satisfied.
Interests can also be considered in long-term ways. By modifying traditional agreements
to address future interests—whether procedural, substantive, or psychological—the
agreement is better equipped for climate change. It will also be more resilient, as the
agreement will be able to withstand, and even thrive in, crises.
Mechanisms for adaptation, eventualities, and flexibility within agreements are
not uncommon; in fact, provisions are present in as many as three-quarters of
14

transboundary water treaties (Tir and Stinnett, 2012). The following section will examine
the context of and arguments for provisions and mechanisms, before returning to the
foundation of interests and needs, established above, in the creation of a provision list.

Literature on Provisions in Water Agreements
There is a broad body of literature on the existence and promotion of provisions
within transboundary water treaties. The underlying theory is that provisions can, if done
correctly, impact the treaty’s capacity for withstanding conflict. As Tir and Stinnett write:
“The central hypothesis is that the more institutional features [provisions] a treaty
contains, the more effective it will be in preventing the occurrence of militarized conflicts
between signatory states” (2012, 218). The theory is further expanded in this thesis, to
propose that provisions can impact the treaty’s resiliency in withstanding negative
trajectories.
A provision is defined as “the action of providing or supplying something for
use,” specifically “for future eventualities or requirements” (Google Dictionary). Its Latin
origin, providere, means to foresee or to attend to. Both are action-oriented verbs with
positive connotations. The optimism connoted from the idea of provisions syncs with the
cooperation and collaboration necessary in transboundary agreements, both in conception
and in implementation. In other words, the very roots of provisions imply the hope of
resiliency. For this reason, the term provision is used over semi-synonymous terms, like
“rules” (Drieschova and Eckstein) or “criteria” (d'Estrée and Colby), employed in other
contexts.

15

Several authors have written extensively in the literature on treaty provisions.
Their works, discussed in brief below and expanded upon in topical discussions later in
this section, have been defining pieces in compiling a master list of treaty provisions. Tir
and Stinnett (2012) found that water scarcity increases the chance of militarized conflict,
but that “highly institutionalized river agreements” create cooperative riparian
interactions and reduce militarized interstate disputes by 71% (2012, 212, 221). The
authors defined institutionalization by four provisions—monitoring, conflict
management, enforcement provisions, and intergovernmental organizations—and purport
all four provisions to be important in an agreement’s ability to withstand climate change.
Ultimately, the authors found that 72% of the treaties examined in their empirical
research had at least one institutional provision — 47% included monitoring provisions,
7% had enforcement provisions, 35% had conflict management provisions, and 35%
delegated authority to an international institution (Tir and Stinnett, 2012, 216). Though
far from comprehensive provision coverage, the findings are encouraging, and provide a
basis for determining whether provisions are effective or merely prevalent.
A World Bank report by Dinar et al. (2016) identified similar findings in their
literature review of water treaty resiliency. They cited the findings of Dinar et al. (2015),
which underscored the importance of Tir and Stinnett’s four provisions, and further found
that flexibility and directness in water allocation are important to agreement stability.
Dinar et al. (2016) also identified the findings of Mitchell and Zawahri (2015), which
suggested that the exchange of data and an enforcement provision both reduced the
likelihood of military encounters and increased the likelihood that negotiations would be
successful in resolving the conflict.
16

In a similar vein, Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) identified a list of cooperative
transboundary mechanisms. Their motivation is to use provisions “to establish an
internationally more benign environment that is conducive to cooperation and mutual
burden sharing” (2014, 52). Drieschova and Eckstein distinguish between substantive and
procedural “rules” [provisions]. Two of their identified rules overlap with Tir and
Stinnett, monitoring and dispute resolution, and with Mitchell and Zawahri (2015),
transparent data sharing, but the majority of Dreischova and Eckstein’s provisions are
distinct. These include technical and financial cooperation, prior notice and consultation,
flexibility mechanisms, amendment mechanisms, allocation methods, and prioritization
of use.
Green et al. (2013) similarly promote seven elements necessary for “institutional
and ecological resilience” in their research on the Okavango River Basin. They argue that
natural resource management accompanies “a cycle of experimenting, monitoring,
learning, and adapting” (2013, 1), and that a successful water agreement includes a
variety of mechanisms for enabling resiliency through cooperation and adaptation. Green
et al. (2013) highlight the importance of water allocation methods, provisions for extreme
events, and joint management commissions, while also joining the academic chorus
promoting enforcement, dispute resolution, and joint monitoring and information
exchanges. Green et al. also underscore the significance of horizontal and vertical flows
of information and coordination, adaptive management, public participation, and the
authority to respond to changing circumstances.
d'Estrée and Colby (2004) use a framework for evaluating success in water
conflict resolution, of which some aspects reiterate—or at least enlighten—provisions for
17

a water agreement. Criteria for evaluating success include cost effective implementation
and financial feasibility of an agreement, environmental sustainability, compliance and
incentives for compliance, flexibility, and the ability to resolve future disputes (2004).
Though the criteria extracted are for measuring the success of an agreement, instead of
for conjecturing the success of an agreement, there is illumination for creating provisions
from the posthumous identification of success in an agreement.
Troell and Swanson (2014, 26) identified provisions that address the multisectoral challenges of water stresses. Changes to the hydrologic cycle will indirectly
shape other potential areas of conflict, both related and unrelated to water—ranging from
agriculture and biodiversity to urbanization and world markets. The implication here is
that climate changes to the water cycle will have drastic felt impacts across the social and
environmental spectrum, exacerbating existing and latent conflicts. Troell and Swanson
propose four methods for adaptive water management (2014, 31). The first is the creation
or emphasis of policies, practices, and institutional mechanisms [provisions] for
flexibility and facilitating knowledge sharing. The second is multilevel governance, and
the third is the inclusion of stakeholders in the full process of management. The fourth is
using an ecosystem-based approach to ensure environmental flows and resiliency. These
provisions identify flexibility, vertical and horizontal integration, and the environment as
essential considerations to include in treaties.
Finally, a UNDP report overviewing transboundary water agreements found seven
topical themes across 145 agreements [see Image 1.3 below] (Human Development
Report, 2006). Though not specific to the creation of provisions, the report provides a
sense of the priorities of most riparians, which illumines the provisions most relevant to
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most agreements. More than three quarters of agreements focused on hydropower (39%)
and water utilization (37%). Far less frequent were sections on flood control (9%),
industry allocation (6%), navigation (4%), and pollution (4%). Only one of the 145
surveyed agreements addressed fishing. As provisions are examined and extracted, it is
important to frame them in light of their relevance to the majority of water agreements.
Image 1.3. Sectorial Distribution of 145 Agreements on Transboundary Water Resources (Human
Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis. UNDP, 2006)

In examining the literature on provisions, three major themes were repeated
throughout. First, there is significant overlap of identified provisions between authors.
This not only suggests that the provision is worthwhile and important to include, but that
its inclusion is broadly supported in the academic community. Second, though few
authors specifically identified the theory of resiliency as an important foundation, most
authors used words like adaptation, flexibility, sustainability, and stability in justifying
the purpose of provisions. This suggests that the purpose of provisions is largely the
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same; provisions are designed from the motivation to prevent conflict and encourage
cooperation. Finally, the literature on provisions emphasized, whether implicitly or
explicitly, the importance of content in an agreement. There is very little discussion on
issues of implementation. As will be discussed in the conclusion of this thesis, the
overemphasis on content may be exaggerating the weight that provisions actually hold in
a treaty’s resiliency to climate change, and even conflict in general.
The literature detailed above was foundational in articulating what provisions
look like. The following subsections better describe the nature of the provisions
identified, and further detail their application to water agreements.

Intergovernmental Institutions
One of the most common provisions in established water agreements are
intergovernmental institutions, also called commissions or interstate organizations. Tir
and Stinnett (2012) found that where there are transboundary institutions, the likelihood
of militarized conflict between riparians is reduced. Institutions established within
treaties can address how rivers will be used and allocated, and how water quality, water
levels, and navigation will be respected, because the institution facilitates diplomacy,
communication, and cooperation (Tir and Stinnett, 2012, 217). The distinct nature of
delegated authorities also keeps issues from becoming political, as it frames problems as
technical and methodological issues to be resolved through logic and science.
Green et al. (2013) promote joint management for similar reasons. Commissions
function outside the “diplomatic restraints” of the political community, as technocrats
from each state can collaboratively problem solve issues related to management,
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conservation, and allocation, without the burden of politics. Green et al. recommend a
provision for joint management that integrates all related issues to a basin into the
authority of one overarching body, with the proper authority to respond to crises. They
argue that this is required for efficient governance over a basin, writing: “Otherwise, the
system is well informed but impotent” (2013, 5).
Considering Tir and Stinnett and Green et. al’s promotion of an intergovernmental
body, Intergovernmental Institution is the first identified provision to be included in the
provision list. This provision recommends designating an intergovernmental institution
with self-governance and minimal political oversight, thereby reducing political volatility
and ensuring long-term consistency in the management of a shared basin.

Reframing the Value of Water
Tir and Stinnett (2012) argue that the value of water will increase, especially
psychologically, as climate change impacts are felt at a basin level. Perceived value of
water is directly tied to conflict over water. Water’s value increases the risk of conflict in
four ways. First, the increased value of water will heighten actual tensions and the
likelihood of tensions, especially in regions where secondary water sources—such as
groundwater or rain catchment—are scarcer than the rivers (Tir and Stinnett, 2012).
Consider Jordan and Israel as an example where an ineffectual water treaty would have
significant conflict implications. Second, increased demand for river water will increase
objections to other riparians’ uses, such as agriculture or industrial use (Tir and Stinnett,
2012). In Central Asia, the amount of water employed by downstream riparians for cotton
irrigation is vocally objected to by its upstream neighbors. Third, Tir and Stinnett
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anticipate an increase in coercive diplomacy, as nation-states will be less patient with the
process of diplomacy. This could include saber rattling, threats, or economic pressures
from the stronger riparians. Returning again to Central Asia, Uzbekistan former president
threatened weaker Tajikistan with war over their shared water resources. And fourth,
poorly managed transboundary basins have a spillover effect into other conflict areas,
risking the overall exacerbation of dyadic conflicts (Tir and Stinnett, 2012, 214). In other
words, water is a good excuse to fight, irrespective of the grounds. Tir and Stinnett’s
argument is that water scarcity, water value, and water conflict are a ladder of escalation.
Therefore, considering the arguments raised by Tir and Stinnett, Reframing the
Value of Water is a provision to be included in the provision list. This provision
recommends that riparians employ reframing techniques, such as those used in prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tuersley), the behavioral economic theory that proposes people
engage with risk in different ways. In the case of water, recognizing that people have an
aversion to loss, this provision recommends that riparians reframe the value of water
through a lens of mutual gain, instead of a lens of “giving”, or worse: ”losing”, water to
another riparians. Collaboration and cooperation benefit citizens throughout the basin,
whereas isolation and noncompliance result in higher losses overall.

Vertical and Horizontal Integration
Troell and Swanson (2014) highlight the importance of multilevel governance and
the inclusion of all stakeholders, as climate change impacts will be felt across the social
and environmental spectrum. Troell and Swanson propose mitigating the intersectoral
and multisectoral impacts through horizontal integration, which they describe as “inter22

institutional and intersectoral coordination and cooperation” (2014, 26) to address the
sectoral and policy fragmentation. A possible example would be integrating reforestation
plans into official water management, a concept promoted broadly by organizations like
The Nature Conservancy (www.plantabillion.org). Accompanying horizontal integration
is vertical integration, meaning governance coordination in basin planning that ranges
from local to regional to international levels (Troell and Swanson, 2014, 27). Troell and
Swanson extend this approach to even the household level, where adaptability should
relate to and inform basin wide policies (2014, 27). Two examples of attempts at vertical
and horizontal integration are the 1992 Convention of the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Public Participation in
Environmental Decision-Making. The 1992 Convention established norms for
stakeholder engagement in international governance; the 1998 Aarhus Convention is
international law that, in turn, reinforces the 1992 Convention (Troell and Swanson,
2014, 27).
Green et al. (2013) echo a similar sentiment regarding vertical integration:
“In addition to including multiple levels of governance and
nongovernmental local action, resilience thinking assures that the
coordination must at least occur at the scale of the socio-ecological system
involved but must include linkage to multiple scales of governance to
allow adaptive response” (2013, 5).
Resiliency in a basin is closely tied to governance at multiple levels. This also parallels
the discussion on factors for resiliency in the resiliency section above.
Therefore, the Vertical and Horizontal Integration provision is a provision to be
included in the provision list. The provision aims to break down the siloed and
fragmented approaches to water management through horizontal integration—the inter23

institutional and -sectoral inclusion in coordination and management, and vertical
integration—the multi-level governance inclusion in coordination and management.

Addressing Hydrologic Variability
Water sharing agreements typically include institutional aspects for water
allocation. The four most common methods are proportional allocation, fixed flow
allocation, a combination of proportional and fixed flow, and non-water transfers (Ansink
and Ruijs, 2008). Proportional allocation gives a percentage of river flow to riparians
(such as 28% to A and 72% to B), whereas fixed flow allocation uses specific metrics of
river flow (such as 39,200 MCM to A and 140,000 MCM to B). A combination method
grants riparians certain minimums, and then allocates the remainder by percentage. For
example, Ansink and Ruijs highlight the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 between Egypt
and Sudan, which grants specific million cubic meters per country, and then grants
percentages of the remaining flow (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008, 251).2 Finally, non-water
transfers include the transfer of lump sums, annual payments, exchanged resources, and
even the absence of militarized conflict (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008).
Green et al. (2013) report that riparians rarely define water allocations, and those
that do, do so in a way that ignores hydrologic variation. Of the 145 transboundary river
treaties signed in the 20th century, nearly half address water allocation, but few address
hydrologic variability (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008; Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014). Green et
a. (2013) found that, statistically, only percentage-based allocation promotes resiliency.
2

Egypt receives 48,000 MCM per year and Sudan receives 4,000 MCM per year. Of the
remaining flow, Sudan receives 66% and Egypt receives 34%.
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This compliments findings by Dinar et al. (2010), which found that no allocation method,
fixed allocation, or allocation of the entire river increased basin tensions. This was
similar to findings by Ansink and Ruijs (2008), who found that an agreement where the
downstream riparian is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability.
However, Ansink and Ruijs found that the highest stability is when the upstream riparian
is allocated a fixed amount—even higher than if riparians have proportional allocations
(Ansink and Ruijs, 2008).3
Significant to climate change, however, is Ansink and Ruijs’ (2008) finding that
decreased river flow decreases agreement stability, yet increased variance can either
increase or decrease stability. In other words, variability offers opportunity to ensure
cooperation and stability are the norm. Without mechanisms to adapt to variations in river
flow, it is less likely that riparians will comply with the terms of the water agreement.
Therefore, Addressing Hydrologic Variability is a provision to be included in the
provision list. Though quantity and quality will vary by context, this provision proposes
that the mechanisms of allocation should either grant the upstream riparians a fixed
amount of water or grant all riparians a percentage of the water.

Monitoring
Monitoring provisions have wide support in the literature. Tir and Stinnett (2012)
described monitoring provisions as the mandated collection of data. They argue that this

3

The authors recognize that a different study found proportional allocation to be more efficient
than fixed flow allocation. However, efficiency is distinct from stability. The authors believe
stability is more critical in light of climate change.
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provision is especially important for climate change, where water shortages could be
caused by climatic issues like drought, instead of political issues like upstream overuse.
Monitoring provisions prevent some conflicts through information. Similarly, the
transparency that accompanies monitoring can alleviate fears that riparians are using
more than their fair share.
Green et al. write that monitoring is an important cooperative process for
riparians, citing the findings of Dinar et al. (2010), which found a correlation between
monitoring and fewer grievances between riparians. Drieschova and Eckstein (2014)
write that monitoring allows parties to become aware of unexpected basin conditions, and
also allow riparians to consider adjusting or amending the current agreement.
As such, Monitoring is a provision added to the provision list. Monitoring is a
process-oriented focus on mutual collection of data through continued collaboration and
shared resources. The mandated collection of data further assists in climate change
resiliency by clarifying water supply changes (Tir and Stinnett, 2012). Therefore, this
provision recommends that water agreements require regular, publicly available, and
ongoing joint monitoring of shared water supplies. Particular emphasis should be placed
on climate changes and future modelling of hydrologic changes.

Dispute Resolution
Considering that a major motivation to study agreements is to mitigate and
prevent conflict, it is of little surprise that conflict resolution is identified as an important
provision within water agreements by most authors. D'Estrée and Colby (2004) identify
the ability to resolve future disputes as a measure of success; Tir and Stinnett (2012)
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identify dispute resolution as a significant provision within water agreements; and Green
et al. (2013) write that dispute resolution mechanisms are a “failsafe” for noncompliance
and defection. Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) highlight the Pact of Bogota, or the 1948
American Treaty on Pacific Settlements, as an example of dispute resolution process. It
begins with negotiation, escalates to mediation, and then, if parties were unable to resolve
the dispute, moves to arbitration under the International Court of Justice (2014, 64).
As such, Dispute Resolution is a provision added to the provision list. Possibly the
most important of all provisions, this one promotes direct and collaborative resolution
through a provision that is culturally relevant, clearly defined, and complete with
escalation plans and a pre-identified, mutually-acceptable third party. Such a provision is
foundational to a resilient transboundary river agreement.

Enforcement
Provisions for enforcement are also broadly supported in the literature. Tir and
Stinnett (2012) purport that enforcement provisions give bite to agreements, dissuading
riparians who would cheat from doing so. The authors argue that if sanctioning and
similar punishments are detailed in an agreement, then enforcements are seen as more
legitimate and less retaliatory or reactionary. Green et al. (2013) also argue that an
enforcement provision is important to a water agreement. They write that enforcement
can also be structured through positive means, such as benefit-sharing or through a
mechanism that ties water to another interdependent issue, such as trade. By targeting
areas critical to riparians, compliance becomes self-enforcing (Green et al., 2013).
D'Estrée and Colby (2004) similarly discuss compliance as the most common indicator of
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success in an agreement; it is logical, then, that a mechanism that encourages compliance
would be a mechanism that increases the likelihood of its success.
Therefore, considering its importance in the literature, Enforcement is a provision
on the provision list. The provision should be strong enough to dissuade riparians from
cheating, while also predetermining what punishments are legitimate responses. This
provision recommends dictating enforcement-oriented discipline that is contextually
feasible and well publicized as the response to noncompliance.

Technical and Financial Cooperation
A less common, but important provision pertains to the ability to execute
elements of an agreement, particularly the technical and financial elements. A major
barrier to overcome within an agreement is infrastructure. For example, how
infrastructure is to be implemented has impacts on the feasibility of its implementation.
Jeuland discusses how international conditionalities on water infrastructure “may be
altering riparians’ willingness and ability to develop their water resources” (2017, 344).
He argues that international funders and development organizations impose the economic
burden of conditionalities on developing countries—a way of projecting “conditionalities
that the developed countries had not faced during their own development process”
(Jeuland, 2017, 345). These conditionalities include integrated water resource
management, power production, stakeholder engagement, and scrutiny during the design
and implementation of projects like dams. Though conditionalities may be important in
the safe and sustainable operationalizing of infrastructure, the technical and financial
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elements require significant cooperation. This cooperation should be determined within
the water agreement.
Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) further underscore the critical role that technical
and financial cooperation play in harnessing resources for research, development,
emergency funds, and offsetting impacts of climate change. They use the Convention on
Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube as an example of this
cooperation. The treaty assures riparians that “mutual assistance upon the request of other
Contracting Parties" will be given in times of crisis (Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014, 61).
As such, the Technical and Financial Cooperation provision is part of the
provision list. Coordination of financial and technical efforts is important to the
environmental and infrastructural health of a basin. This provision proposes an insurance
mechanism specifically geared for funding emergencies and critical infrastructure, as
well as for the gradual development of technology needed to maintain basin health. By
establishing clear guidelines for its use, by contributing equitably, and by pooling
resources, the provision establishes resilient responsiveness for climate change.

Institutional Learning
An intriguing proposition for continuous improvement, provisions related to the
idea of institutional learning were hinted or suggested in the literature. Green et al. (2013)
frame a provision for adaptive management as a means to address the continuation of
learning and adaptation in an agreement. The authors recommend establishing “iterative
processes,” or cyclical systems for improvement, into the management of a shared basin
(2013). In d'Estrée and Colby’s (2004) framework, the purpose behind the evaluation of
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conflict resolution in water agreements is to further institutional learning, to address what
worked and what did not, and then to reform aspects that need improvement.
Considering the importance of adaptation and flexibility within resiliency,
Institutional Learning is a provision added to the provision list to enable the
intergovernmental bodies governing a watershed to modify or enhance practices through
self-improvement. Institutional learning includes monitoring and evaluation, feedback
loops (Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014), and training within the institution. This provision
broadly captures a need for ever-improving performance and accountability.

Transparency
Transparency is a theme among provision literature that, though not necessarily
captured in a singular provision, resonates within other provisions. Tir and Stinnett
(2012) refer to transparency as a reason for monitoring. Green et al. (2013) refer to
transparency as a reason for enforcement, as transparency encourages compliance.
Drieschova and Eckstine (2014) propose a provision for data sharing as a transparent
mechanism. They write that data sharing promotes “harmonization,” because when all
parties have the same information, misunderstandings are less likely.
As such, Transparency and Trust Building is a provision added to the provision
list. This provision specifically aims to reduce distrust between riparians resulting from
water scarcity (Tir and Stinnett, 2012) through data sharing. This prevents other riparians
from employing enforcement mechanisms unjustifiably, allows riparians to engage
flexibility mechanisms on the momentum of cooperation, and grants veracity to tracking
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the impacts of climate change. This provision specifically differs from Monitoring
because of its psychological and relational emphasis.

Prior Notice
Drieschova and Eckstein (2014) identify prior notice and consultation as a
provision to be included in water agreements. They outline the two halves of prior notice:
first, that riparians will consult the other; second, that riparians agree not to begin
potentially impactful activities without consent of the other. The authors write that
though prior notice and consultation are obligatory under international law, including the
1997 U.N. Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
including a provision within an agreement enhances trust and certainty.
Therefore, Prior Notice is a provision to be included on the provision list.
Stipulating the provision in a water agreement provides a structured mechanism for
reducing basin stress and enhancing riparian trust. Ultimately, this provision aims to be
“conducive to the search for cooperative solutions that meet changing water priorities”
(Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014, 63).
Amendment
An amendment provision is, essentially, a flexibility mechanism that
institutionalizes a lesson learned or eventuality come to pass. Drieschova and Eckstein
(2014) argue that it makes an agreement “inherently more adaptable.” An amendment
mechanism allows governance to shift with new scientific or technological advances, or
when water flows have changed. This mechanism would be well suited for many climatechange-impacted contexts. Consider, for example, the Aral Sea Basin in Central Asia:
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agriculture and cotton account for a large percentage of the economy, demanding
significant and seasonal irrigation supply. As economic development and urbanization
reshape regional growth, water usage will change accordingly. An amendment
mechanism would allow the Central Asian riparians to adapt their agreements to the new
context, through a consensus-based process that becomes a permanent treaty amendment.
The Amendment provision is added to the provision list as an extreme flexibility
measure. It builds upon preexisting cooperation to adapt to unexpected circumstances
without forfeiting the collaborative progress made up to that point. Amendments can be
proposed on an as-needed basis, or following certain scenarios like scientific
breakthroughs or extended droughts. Regardless, the provision enhances the resiliency of
an agreement.

Prioritization of Use
A provision detailing the prioritization of water use allows riparians to plan for
allocation in times of scarcity (Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014). The idea, as articulated
by Drieschova and Eckstein, is that the provision provides substantive flexibility while
recognizing the essential human element of water allocation. For example, riparians
could prioritize household use first, and scaling up into agriculture, environment,
hydropower, and other economic or industrial needs. This method not only allows
adaptability to water quantity, but to water demands (Drieschova and Eckstein, 2014).
The provision dovetails with a point raised by Tir and Stinnett (2012), when they
highlighted that, in times of river scarcity, riparian water use becomes a source of
conflict. They highlighted agricultural and industrial use as being particularly
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controversial. A provision like Drieschova and Eckstein’s would enable riparians to
determine priorities prior to the time of scarcity, thereby reducing conflict.
As such, the provision of Prioritization of Water Use is added to the provision list
to address the need within agreements for substantive flexibility. The goal of this
provision is to provide a scale of priorities for times of water scarcity, emergencies, and
unexpected changes to the hydrologic system.

Communication Channels
Foundational to enhancing any relationship, and especially for encouraging
quality cooperation and coordination, are functional communication channels. Like
transparency, communication is a theme prevalent in the literature on provisions, but not
as a stand-alone mechanism. Green et al. (2013) discuss the importance of
communication within governance and information sharing. Drieschova and Eckstein
(2014) underscore communication in their provision for data sharing, arguing that data
sharing “can inaugurate the first communication channels” (60). D'Estrée and Colby
(2004) measure the success of the relationship between parties through indicators related
to communication: general relationship quality, reduction in hostility, and cognitive shifts
in perception of the other party.
However, considering communication’s role in any bi- or multilateral agreement,
the provision for Communication Channels is included on the provision list. The
provision should include preferred channels, the minimum frequency of communication,
and who is to be included in what types of communications. This latter stipulation could
include forums for regional countries or basin-specific stakeholder engagement. The
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provision’s ultimate purpose is to increase the quality of communication, to promote the
attributes needed to withstand negative climate change pressures.

Provisions from Conflict and Water Literature
There are a number of active water conflicts in the world, and a host of research
on the factors and circumstances that prevent or inflame them. Researchers have
examined the impacts of geography, methods of allocation, power relations, population
size, and even financial options of riparians, in order to identify factors related to conflict.
In this section, root causes of water conflicts are examined as impetus for the creation of
corresponding provisions. Though the research does not directly propose provisions,
provisions are extracted from the instigators of conflict to reduce the likelihood of
conflict. By doing so, the goal is to increase an agreement’s ability to withstand negative
trajectories.

Reciprocal Resource Trade
Lee and Mitchell (2010) found that the geographic location of a riparian in a river
basin can increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict or cooperation. The authors
examined four scenarios of up- and downstream riparians, with emphasis on the impact
of energy production (such as coal, gas, or electricity) in the relationship. The empirical
research showed that militarized conflict was most common between riparians that
produced no energy (56%), yet risk was highest for militarized conflict when the
downstream riparian has no energy resources of its own and therefore must use force to
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protect its water rights (Lee and Mitchell, 2010). By comparison, the lowest risk of
conflict is when the downstream riparian has its own energy resources, while the
upstream riparian does not. The authors essentially found that when riparians could
reciprocate resources—energy for water, and vice versa—the basin was less prone to
militarized conflict. Resource interdependence is good for basin stability.
This interdependence is exemplified by the Syr Darya and Amu Darya basins in
Central Asia (Lee and Mitchell, 2010). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the upstream
riparians with significant energy deficiencies; Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the
downstream users with sufficient energy resources. Previously, regional conflict has been
caused by the seasonality of water demands. On one hand, the downstream users need
water for irrigation during the growing season. On the other, the upstream riparians need
hydroelectricity during the cold winter months. Because water shortages are chronic,
winter releases contribute to the water allocation quotas of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,
which aggravate their political and economic concerns. Reciprocal energy trade offers a
solution to the seasonality problem. By employing reciprocal energy trade, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan can import energy from the downstream riparians during the winter
months—when ordinarily hydroelectricity would be required to meet the heightened
wintertime energy demands—allowing for greater releases during the summer months,
when the thirsty cotton crops require substantial irrigation.
Therefore, since trading resources can both be included in water agreements and
is shown to reduce the likelihood of conflict, Reciprocal Resource Trade is a provision
included on the provision list. Trading resources-for-resources enhances interdependence
and balances power. Thus, the purpose of this provision is to promote basin stability.
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Recognition of Rights
A source of regular conflict is the recognition of rights. Rights are tied closely to
identity and respect, and are a prevalent issue in many ongoing disputes. Consider, for
example, the recognition of Israel in its negotiations in the Middle East. Though not as
volatile nor publicized, recognition of rights to water is likewise important. In the Indus
Waters Treaty, following nine years of negotiations and a bloody post-colonial rupture,
the recognition of rights to water constitutes much of the treaty’s preamble. In the case
study later in this thesis, recognition of rights to water dominates much of the early
Central Asian water treaty.
The proposed provision for Recognition of Rights is added to the provision list to
recognize the entrenched psychological need of rights. The recognition of someone’s
rights soothes their fears, builds trust, and establishes a playing field as equals. This
provision requires the articulation of rights of all riparians within the agreement. The
underlying belief is that satisfying a psychological concern will promote stability, and
therefore resiliency, in a basin.

Power Balancing
Lee and Mitchell (2010) found that the greater the power imbalance between
riparians, the less likely militarized conflict is (Lee and Mitchell, 2010). Their finding
syncs with multiple examples, but may be best exemplified in the transboundary
relationship of the U.S. and Canada, which shares twelve distinct transboundary basins
(See Image 1.4). The U.S., which has a population of 325.7 million and a GDP of $18.57
trillion, dwarfs its geographically-larger but politically-smaller neighbor Canada, which
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has a population of 36.29 million and a GDP of $1.53 trillion (World Bank via Google
Data). The power imbalance could be a factor in the overwhelming success of the
International Joint Commission of the United States and Canada in managing the shared
water resources. The sentiment was well summarized by Canada’s former Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau, who said of Canada’s relationship with the United States: “Living next to
you is, in some ways, like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and eventempered is the beast...one is affected by every twitch and grunt” (CBC Archives, 1969).
Image 1.4 The Twelve Shared River Basins of the US and Canada (IJC)

Therefore, considering that many transboundary basins do not have a significant
power imbalance between riparians, the provision for Power Balancing is on the
provision list. This provision aims to address the multitude of basins that are more prone
to militarized conflict because they lack a clear hegemon. The provision articulates
designating power-balancing through third party consultants and arbitrators, in order to
place contestation between riparians in a neutral context.
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Population Pressures
Lee and Mitchell (2010) found that the larger the population, the greater the risk
of militarized conflict. The inference is that larger populations place greater pressure on
governments to provide water, while also inflating the amount of water needed even in
emergencies. This finding correlates with several of the most prominent water disputes of
today, including Ethiopia and Egypt, with 102.4 million people and 95.69 million people
respectively, and India and Pakistan, with 1.3 billion people and 193 million people
respectively (World Bank via Google Data). MIT professor Elfatih A B Eltahir writes to
the former example, purporting that population pressures in the Nile Basin are largely at
fault for rising tensions. Eltahir writes that the current population growth is unsustainable
for both land and water use in the region, thereby escalating tensions (2017, Nature Asia).
The lesson to be extracted from this finding is that a provision for Alleviating
Population Pressures should be added to the provision list. This provision recommends
addressing the greater strains of a population through contextually appropriate technical
solutions that increase water storage capacity. These solutions may include aquifer
recharge, dams, irrigation canals, or other engineering solutions that facilitate supply to
larger populations in times of need.

Provisions from Adaptability in Water Management
Inspiration for provisions are sourced from more than just academic literature.
Adaptability-in-practice, or the application of adaptability mechanisms in water
management, gives insight to provisions that guide water management towards resiliency.
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These specifically include provisions for the environment and for flexibility. The
following discussion will better detail the relationship between flexibility and
environmental management, and how intentional inclusion of both can increase the
resiliency within a water agreement.
One IUCN report states: “Adaptation to climate change refers to adjustment in
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (emphasis added,
Barchiesi et al., 2014, 16). In other words, adaptation in the era of climate change will
require adjustment, but not necessarily in negative ways. There is opportunity for
adaptive and flexible provisions to shape the management of natural resources like water.
Jeuland (2017) writes:
“Climate change offers perhaps the starkest example of the complexity
induced by human-nature system interconnections...The sheer complexity
of the suite of potential changes, and the particular exposure of the water
sector to them, have led researchers to propose a range of new methods
that...emphasize the need to invest in ways that maintain adaptive
flexibility.” (p. 347)
Flexibility is not a new concept in the realm of water treaty research. Drieschova
and Eckstein (2014) argue that formalized flexibility has three benefits for riparians.
First, flexibility can increase the pace of amendments to an agreement necessary for
responding to climate change. Second, flexibility can ease the process of negotiating an
agreement, because flexibility reduces the rigidity of an agreement. Third, flexibility
allows for maintaining the spirit of an agreement without the original wording (2014, 52).
Adaptive capacity, however, is a newer concept in the realm of water treaty
research. Smit and Pilifosova (2001) define adaptive capacity as “the potential or ability
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of a system, region, or community to adapt to the effects or impacts of climate change,”
and that its enhancement “represents a practical means of coping with changes and
uncertainties in climate, including variability and extremes…reduc[ing] vulnerabilities
and promot[ing] sustainable development” (quoted in Stucker and Lopez-Gunn, 2014, 3).
In other words, adaptive capacity is resiliency-building; it is strengthening the
mechanisms necessary for mitigating impacts of climate change and enhancing
cooperation. The concept of adaptive capacity can be, and should be, a means for
determining resilient provisions. The approach emphasizes capacity for coping and
withstanding climate change—a foundational aspiration in the application of resiliency
theory to water agreements.

Flexibility Mechanism
As discussed above, flexibility within an agreement offers multiple advantages to
riparians, and is critical to resiliency in an agreement. Flexibility is a term promoted in
practice by the IUCN, by the UN, and in the literature. Green et al. (2013) articulate the
need within agreements to respond to changed circumstances on short notice, as well as
for iterative processes promoting resiliency. Likewise, Dinar et al. (2015) found that
flexibility mechanisms had a positive correlation with a treaty’s long-term effectiveness.
In response to support for the concept, a provision for Flexibility is added to the
provision list. Though a flexibility provision overlaps with many pre-identified
provisions, such as the Amendment and Monitoring provisions, flexibility allow for
impromptu or short-notice adjustments to governance without, necessarily, long-term
implementation of the flexible action. Flexibility also allows riparians to incorporate
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lessons-learned from the field of water management, such as Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM, discussed below) or other management frameworks.

Environmental Considerations
Adaptive capacity illumines the importance of including the environment in
agreements. Impacts to the environment are inherent to water agreements, especially in
agreements that include water allocation, infrastructure, and industry. Troell and
Swanson write that environmental flows, meaning “the quality, quantity, and time of
freshwater flows,” are “critical to maintaining ecosystem health and resilience, especially
in basins that are already subject to significant levels of abstractive use and pollution”
(2014, 28, emphasis added). The eventualities of the environment deserve to be
incorporated in governance.
The concept has been explored through adaptability practices, such as Integrated
Water Resource Management (IWRM). IWRM is defined by the Global Water
Partnership as “a process which promotes the coordinated development and management
of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and
social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital
ecosystems” (UN, “IWRM”, 2014, emphasis added). The backbone of IWRM is the
inclusive, participatory planning process; it involves stakeholders in the management of
nature, in order to address concepts such as sustainability, interconnectivity,
accountability, and adaptability (Troell and Swanson, 2014, 29).
Considering how the environment has been included in other frameworks, a
provision for Environmental Considerations is added to the provision list. This provision
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articulates the rights of and obligations to the environment within an agreement. It
increases the stability of the agreement in the long term, by mitigating the negative
environmental impacts of a treaty and ensuring that necessary water flows for the
environment exist, thereby ensuring the future of the water agreement itself.

Creation of Provisions List
Over the course of reviewing relevant literature, many provisions were extracted
to establish a comprehensive list of provisions for climate change resiliency in
transboundary river agreements. Each provision may not apply in every context, but the
argument is that the majority combined will enhance any transboundary river agreement
regardless of culture, geographical location, or basin challenges. That being said, the base
assumptions behind the provisions are the same assumptions underlying interest-based
negotiations: that parties negotiate in good faith, look for win-win solutions, prioritize
long-term relationships over short-term victories, and set aside positions for mutuallysatisfying solutions. These provisions are foundationless without good-faith riparians.
Structurally, the list is divided between enhancement and mitigation provisions.
Enhancement provisions facilitate cooperation in areas more likely to be collaborative;
mitigation provisions reduce escalation in situations identified to be more prone to
conflict. The purpose in creating two lists is to underscore the significance of both in
addressing impacts of climate change.
Furthermore, the organization below extends beyond that of Drieschova and
Eckstein, who organized a like-minded list of “rules” into substantive and procedural
categories (2014), by adding a category for psychological needs. The organization below
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thereby represents the three types of interests discussed in earlier chapters (Moore, 2003,
75). The triangle of interests, or needs, can be defined thusly: substantive interests refer
to goods, such as quantity of water; procedural interests refer to the process of addressing
needs, such as using the World Bank as mediator or attaining assurance of an annual
forum to address irrigation; and finally, psychological interests are the emotional and
relationship needs, such as ensuring cordial riparian cooperation. The list below considers
psychological needs as a critical consideration because of the complex nature of a
riparian and between riparians.
The list is comprised of 20 provisions, divided into enhancement and mitigation
columns, and organized according to the three categories of interests (see Table 1.2). It is
noteworthy that the majority of provisions generated from the literature are procedural.
The reason is three-part. First, substantive and psychological interests are highly
contextual. The substantive needs of Israel and the West Bank will differ in specifics
from those of Egypt and Ethiopia, as infrastructure, climate, supply, population size, and
economy are just a few of many factors that shape specific substantive needs. Similarly,
the psychological needs are influenced by time, place, and politics: the chemistry
between negotiators, the stability of a political regime, power imbalances between
riparians, and a host of other relationship and emotional demands define psychological
interests. In contrast, procedural needs are generic.
Second, there is no sure way of predicting substantive and psychological interests
in a future shaped by climate change. Procedural mechanisms, on the other hand, offer a
route to future modifications, when psychological or substantive interests have changed.
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Procedural mechanisms are less time-restrained, less impacted by climatic shifts, and less
likely to be wholly reshaped within the lifetime of an agreement.
Finally, the following list is procedural-heavy because the list’s purpose is to
enhance resiliency, and resiliency is action-based. In other words, of the three categories,
procedural provisions address the actions for ensuring an agreement can withstand
climate-induced changes. Procedural provisions are the process to resiliency. Substantive
and psychological interests, though important, will carry less weight in the withstanding
future impacts—especially in a climate changed future—than procedural interests.
Table 1.2: The Provision List

Mitigation
Procedural
Interests

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Enhancement

Enforcement
Dispute resolution
Monitoring
Amendment
Flexibility mechanisms

Psychological 1. Power balancing
Interests
2. Alleviating population
pressures
3. Reframing value of water
Substantive
Interests

1. Addressing hydrologic
variability
2. Prioritization of water use

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Intergovernmental institutions
Vertical / horizontal integration
Financial / technical cooperation
Communication channels
Institutional learning
Prior notice and consultation

1. Transparency and trust-building
2. Recognition of rights

1. Reciprocal resource trade
2. Environmental considerations

As detailed in the prior chapters, provisions for the provision list were specifically
extracted because of ties to attributes that align with resiliency: cooperation, reduced
conflict, the likelihood to endure or even thrive in crises. As such, these provisions are
specifically tailored to water agreements, and even more specifically to climate change
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impacts on water agreements. The relevance of the provision list to other types of
environmental agreements has not been considered.4
In the following section, a treaty heralded as a resilient success is examined in the
context of the provision list. The International Boundary and Water Commission of the
U.S. and Mexico employs several provisions listed in Table 1.2 to enhance its capacity
for managing environmental impacts related to both climate change and human
mismanagement. Following a discussion of the U.S-Mexico treaty, the provision list will
be applied in its entirety to the Central Asian case study to determine whether the
provision list can illumine a region widely recognized for its latent water conflicts, which
occasionally erupt into border violence and escalated political rhetoric.

Flexibility in U.S.-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission
Troell and Swanson (2014) highlight the International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC), established by a treaty between the U.S. and Mexico as a strong
example of innovative basin management. It is an opportunity to consider the success of
provisions in water agreements, and prompt discussion of provisions’ role in resiliency.
The duties of the IBWC have evolved since its establishment in 1899 to include the
implementation of water agreements, resolution of disputes, and distribution and
regulation of the Colorado River. The IBWC also makes managerial and operational
4

Throughout the remainder of the thesis, when discussion a specific provision related to the
provision list, its shorthand reference will be used. First, each reference has either S, Pr, or Ps: S
is for Substantive; Pr is for Procedural; and Ps is for Psychological. Next, the interest is followed
by the type of provision: M is for Mitigation and E is for Enhancement. And finally, the reference
ends in the number of each provision. For example, Power Balancing is the first psychological
interest in the mitigation column. It’s shorthand reference is PsM1.
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recommendations to the governments of the United States and Mexico (Troell and
Swanson, 2014, 37). Most importantly, the IBWC act as the treaty implementers.
The flexibility mechanism of the IBWC is particularly unique because of how
effective it has been in allowing the IBWC to adapt on short notice to unforeseen
environmental situations, or what Troell and Swanson call innovative basin management.
This mechanism, the so-called “minute process,” allows the IBWC to create or amend
rules to the basin treaties that guide their governance. Troell and Swanson explain that
the minutes of a formal decision by the IBWC are forwarded to the Mexican and
American governments; the minutes are considered approved if neither government
rejects the amendment within 30 days (2014, 38). This allows the IBWC to act as needed
with minimal oversight.
The minute process is particularly relevant to the discussion on provisions
because of what it has contributed to: the impressive ability of the U.S. and Mexico to
adapt to difficult basin conditions. The example used by Troell and Swanson is Minute
319, created in November 2012 as an amendment for interim measures that look
remarkably similar to parts of the provision list. The interim measures included water
storage for Mexico in case of shortages (PsM2), environmental considerations (SE2), a
mechanism for water exchange (SE1), and evaluations for informing future measures
(PrE5) (Troell and Swanson, 2014, 39). Furthermore, it involved stakeholders throughout
the vertical and horizontal realms (PrE2), including Native tribes, environmental NGOs,
national and state governments, and more throughout multiple sectors. The authors
specifically highlight one agreement stemming from Minute 319 as a success of adaptive
basin management. As a coordinated irrigation effort, the U.S. and Mexico exchanged
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resources (SE1)—the U.S. contributed $21 million and technical expertise (PrE3) to
improving Mexico’s water infrastructure in exchange for 124,000 acre-feet of Mexico’s
water (PsM3) (2014, 39). Ultimately, the collaboration will mimic a natural flood to
create 2,000 acres of wetland habitat, also improving Mexico’s environment (SM2, SE2).
Of course, the definition of success is not a universal standard, and Drieschova
and Eckstein use the same study of the U.S. and Mexico to underscore instability (2014,
54). A major drought in the late 1990s led to the U.S. and Mexico escalating their
grievances on flow obligations to the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. Mexico claimed it was unable to meet its obligations, and the U.S.
claimed Mexico was unwilling. No resolution was reached until the drought ended in
2005. The argument of Drieschova and Eckstein is that the rigidity of the flow mandates
within the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Rivers Treaty—one of the treaties under which the IBWC
operates—restricted the riparians’ ability to resolve their conflict through alternative
means; it failed to address hydrologic variability (SM1). The implicit question that arises
from this argument, then, is: what is the balance between articulating the perfect
agreement and implementing a resilient, productive relationship?

Conclusion of Section One
The conversations thus far have emphasized the relationship between provisions
and the improvement of resiliency in water agreements. Yet all have assumed, implicitly
or explicitly, the positive relationship between the content of an agreement and the
governance conditions of a basin. This baseline assumption that resiliency inherently
stems from provisions undergirded the initial research question: how can water
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agreements satisfy parties' needs while also considering the future uncertainties of
climate-induced changes to their basins’ hydrological systems, in order to promote
climate change resiliency?
The concept of provisions has been tested in case studies ranging from the US and
Mexico (above) to the Okavango River Basin (Green et al., 2013). However, the case
studies represented in the literature have used partial lists of provisions—such as the four
provisions of enforcement, conflict resolution, intergovernmental institutions, and
monitoring proposed by Tir and Stinnett (2012)—or through the lens of underscoring the
benefits of provisions, which comes with potential bias.
The following case study examines two of the agreements used to govern the
Amu Darya and the Syr Darya basins of Central Asia. The region is an area of personal
significance to the author, plagued by failing water infrastructure, latent water conflicts,
and a heightened vulnerability to climate change due to its glacier-fed river basins and
contemporary Aral Sea disaster. Combined, these factors presented a case study ideal for
applying the provision list.
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Section Two
“Water, thou hast no taste, no color, no odor; canst not be defined, art relished while
ever mysterious. Not necessary to life, but rather life itself, thou fillest us with a
gratification that exceeds the delight of the senses...For thou, water, art a proud divinity,
allowing no alteration, no foreignness in thy being.”
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Wind, Sand and Stars

Image 2.1. Map of Central Asia
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Provisions: A Steppe in the Right Direction?
The concept of provisions has been tested in case studies ranging from the U.S.
and Mexico to the Okavango River Basin of southwest Africa (Troell and Swanson,
2014; Green et al., 2013). However, the case studies represented in the literature need
supplementation for three reasons. First, the case studies represented in the literature have
used partial lists of provisions, such as the four provisions of enforcement, conflict
resolution, intergovernmental institutions, and monitoring proposed by Tir and Stinnett
(2012). Second, the case studies have been applied through the lens of proving the
benefits of provisions in agreements, therefore creating the risk for bias in the selection of
cases and provisions. And third, the case studies used in the literature have failed to
answer the question of whether the content of agreement is directly responsible for the
success of an agreement.
The following case study examines two agreements used to govern the Amu
Darya and Syr Darya basins of Central Asia. It is a region tucked out-of-sight and out-ofmind from much of international affairs; it draws up images of nomads in yurts and
Himalayan hikes without correlation to modernity. The region is an area of personal
significance to the author, and is plagued by failing water infrastructure, latent water
conflicts, and a heightened vulnerability to climate change due to its glacier-fed river
basins and contemporary Aral Sea disaster.
The first section will paint a broader picture of the key actors of Central Asia, as
well as its recent history of conflicts directly and indirectly tied to water. The second
section will examine two of the major agreements governing water resources—the 1992
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Water Resource Management and
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Conservation of Interstate Sources, and the 2008 Statute of the Interstate Commission for
Water Coordination of Central Asia—through an in-depth analysis of the present
provisions, the discourse and text of the agreements, and the relative significance of the
agreements. The final section will discuss the findings of the analysis. The case study will
conclude with the implications for future research areas, and for the field of provision
research.

Analysis of Central Asia’s Water Crisis
Introduction
“We must resolve water issues in the interests of all our countries including issues
related to hydropower construction, water releases, and electricity sharing,” Kazakhstan’s
President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced on March 15, 2018, ahead of the first Central
Asian summit in nearly ten years (RFERL, March 15, 2018). The statement marked a
dramatic change in tone from Uzbekistan’s late president Islam Karimov’s threat of “not
just serious confrontations, but even wars” at the 2013 Forum to Balance Water and
Energy Needs (Pacific Institute). In Central Asia’s rugged and remote corner of the
world, defined climatically by its aridity and thirsty legacy of Soviet antienvironmentalism, water is the backbone of economies and infrastructure. Yet, water is
also in greater demand than supply.
The issue of water rides along, betwixt, and above the regional conflicts of every
sort—issues of terrorism, trade relations, war in Afghanistan, and the pockmarked
landscape of enclaves and exclaves demarking ethnic lines. Water becomes a gambit for
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political negotiations—hence, possibly, Nazarbayev's statement at the 2018 summit, “Our
countries have 70 million people living here around two major rivers—the Amu Darya
and Syr Darya—and we agreed today that no political bargaining is acceptable in the
matter” (RFERL, March 15, 2018). It becomes a source of international attention,
underscored by the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central
Asia (UNRCCA) and the World Bank’s Central Asia Water-Energy Development
Program, both of which aim to alleviate water tensions in the region. And most
alarmingly, water becomes a cause of on-the-ground violence between communities
fighting for access and control (for timeline of specific events, see Appendix A). Border
towns formerly interconnected by Soviet infrastructure are now vulnerable to structural
inequalities and disparities.

Ferghana Valley
Consider the Ferghana Valley as an example of this conflict interconnectivity.
Resting in the spiral of three borders within the Syr Darya watershed, the Valley is the
most densely populated and most agriculturally fertile region in Central Asia, home to
multiple people groups. It is also the most conflicted region. Conflict has stemmed from
horizontal inequalities between groups, such as the 2010 riots of Osh; from political
unrest, as in the Andijan massacre of 2005; from religious extremism, like in the 1992
and 2004 Tashkent bombings; and from vague borders with strict policies that limit
movement in the formerly cohesive Soviet space. One author summarized the volatility
of the Ferghana Valley, writing:
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“The ill-defined borders, the problems of enclaves and exclaves, the huge
number of socio-economic and environmental problems faced by the
inhabitants of the region, power struggles between the political
elites...have made [the Ferghana Valley] one of the most dangerous and
unstable regions of the world” (Borthakur, 2017, 334).
While these conflicts have been, and continue to be, distinct social issues, the
collective turmoil is a melting pot that simmers into frequent, concentrated, and ongoing
disputes around water. As early as 1990, the city of Osh had manifest violence over water
issues, stemming from deeper grievances like government representation and the Soviet
breakup. In one instance, up to 600 people were killed before Soviet troops could
reestablish peace (Stratfor, 2013).

History of the Ferghana Valley
A variety of historical factors have concentrated conflict in the Ferghana Valley.
Socially, Central Asia experienced dramatic shifts after the Kokand Khanate, an Uzbek
dynasty immediately predating tsarist Russia’s rule, fell to colonization in 1876.
Following a period of autonomy in the 1910s within the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic(the successor of tsarism and the predecessor of the USSR), Stalin
implemented ‘divide and rule’ strategies to delineate the borders of the new Soviet
Socialist Republics (SSRs) throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Borthakur, 2017, 336). He
complicated the process by creating ethnic-based socialist states. The Uzbek SSR was
founded in 1924, followed by the Tajik SSR in 1929 and the Kyrgyz and Kazakh SSRs in
1936. This period marked the first time in Central Asia’s history that borders officially
distinguished ethnic majorities. Ethnicity had not existed in Central Asia; people had
previously been grouped “based on clan, region, or religion” (Strafor, 2013).
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Ethnicity, however, was complicated. Different groups defined their origins
differently depending on priorities of language, geographic location, or race. For
example, the term “Uzbek” grew to include the Sart people, who were unrecognized by
the Soviets, as well as Persian speakers—who would typically be considered Tajik—
because they lived in Uzbek-dominated cities (Borthakur, 2017, 337). These factors all
served to create a “geographic jigsaw puzzle” of enclaves, mixed populations, and
interdependence that perpetuates conflict today (Borthakur, 2017, 337-338; see Image 2.2
for depiction of modern ethnic distribution).5
Image 2.2: Demographics of the Ferghana Valley (Stratfor, 2013)

5

Groups include, the three citizenships, as well as the ethnic groups of Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, Tajiks,
Russians, Tatars, Slavs, Armenians, and Meskhetian Turks (Borthakur, 2017, 336).
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Modern Interdependence in the Ferghana Valley
The Ferghana Valley provides a concentrated illustration of the interdependence,
interconnectivity, and similarities predating and postdating the Soviet occupation. Today,
many of these elements continue to define and influence the relationships in Central Asia,
especially the economic, infrastructural, and water regimes implemented by the USSR.
Economically, agricultural output in the Valley is around 79% higher than other
Central Asian regions, with output of about $1000 per hectare, compared to the regional
average of $613 per hectare (Abdullaev, 2010). This heightened output is in part because
of its geographic advantages, but it is also because of extensive infrastructure for the
historically agrarian region. An excerpt from 1882 describes the Valley with “huge water
channels...whole forests of shade-giving trees...fields of wheat, barley, millet sorghum,
corn, rice, beans, sesame, flax, hemp, cotton, and alfalfa…” (Middendorf, 1882, qtd. in
Kreutzmann, 2016, 114). It is of little surprise then, that 12 million people in a
tumultuous geographic depression of 8,500 square miles (Young, 2003, 6), all competing
for the same crop outputs and all dependent on decaying irrigation infrastructure, would
fracture along group lines.
This jigsaw puzzle was structurally ruptured by the breakup of the Soviet Union
in 1991. With independence came the solidification of formerly permeable borders and
the nationalization of formerly shared infrastructure, throwing the ex-SSRs into economic
competition and social turmoil. In addition to the nation-states themselves, enclaves and
exclaves of ethnic populations were delineated—becoming islands of citizens whose
freedom of movement is now a pawn in disputes over resources and infrastructure
(Kreutzmann, 2016, 120). In August 2015, for example, Tajiks blocked a road and
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Kyrgyz blocked a water canal in a disputed region along the border of an enclave in
Kyrgyzstan. The situation escalated into immediate violence. The Tajik border service
reported Kyrgyz villagers using shotguns and Molotov cocktails; the Kyrgyz service
reported 120 Tajiks and 80 Kyrgyz engaged in rock throwing (Putz, 2015). Either way, at
least four people were injured and several homes were damaged.
Finally, according to Hermann Kreutzmann, author of several works on irrigation
in Central Asia, water disputes at the community level have two roots: forced
modernization and constraints of interdependence (Kreutzmann, 2016). Both the Tsarist
and Soviet modernization schemes included major interconnected irrigation systems to
expand cropland into the arid steppes of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This required mass
diversions of water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers from their natural courses
into the Aral Sea via dams, reservoirs, and canals, as illustrated in Image 2.3 below. As
Kreutzmann states: “The control of regional resources and experiments with new
technologies in the Central Asian “laboratory” enable the colonial power to envisage an
interconnected system of producing raw materials in Central Asia and processing them in
Russia” (2016, 116). Thus, the cotton and grains were transported north to Russia to
support the booming textile industry and feed its burgeoning population, at the great
expense of Central Asia’s water resources.
The Ferghana Valley is an example of how interconnected conflict in Central Asia
is. Social, ethnic, economic, and historical factors feed into latent conflict that erupts on
loosely related issues— namely water—at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.
These factors are by no means concentrated in the Ferghana Valley; they spill out and
define much of Central Asia and its regional relations today.
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Image 2.3. Schematic Layout of the Syr Darya Basin (PA Consortium (2002, p. 55), via Wegerich, 2011)

The Aral Sea Basin
The Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins flow without consideration of borders
from the snow-capped peaks of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and onto the southerly steppes
of Kazakhstan, before draining into the remnant of Uzbekistan’s Aral Sea. The basin
spans 1.73 million square kilometers (668,000 square miles), with an average volume of
118.43 cubic kilometers (28.41 cubic miles), through territory with approximately 70
million people (FAO Water Report, 2013). Nearly every drop of the greater Aral Sea
basin is allocated to a national interest. Unfortunately for the riparians—and even more
so for the Aral Sea—there is little extra with which to negotiation, reallocate, or claim.
Like the Ferghana Valley, water in the basin flows in latent conflict, awaiting a
loosely related dispute to thrust it back into the fore. Unlike the Ferghana Valley,
however, the conflict is typically found at the primary level, that of governments and
diplomats, instead of at the community level. The three riparians of the Syr Darya are
Kyrgyzstan, the upstream user, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the downstream users
(see Image 2.4). The riparians of the Amu Darya are Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Afghanistan, the upstream users, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the downstream
users (see Image 2.5).
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Image 2.4 Syr Darya River Basin (Wikicommons)

Image 2.5 Amu Darya River Basin (Wikicommons)

Aral Sea Basin Conflict Perpetrators
In addition to the conflict roots articulated in the discussion of the Ferghana
Valley, two other themes play defining roles in the broader conflict context: actor
instability and water use inefficiencies. First, The actors involved in Central Asia are
volatile and unpredictable. Take, for example, the extreme pendulum swing of
Uzbekistan within a two-year period. Uzbekistan’s new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev,
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recently softened the late president Islam Karimov’s policies on regional relations
(Michel, 2017). The foreign minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov, expressed hope to start
dialogue with its neighbors on water access and management, and that friendly relations
are an “important foreign policy priority” for the new regime. Kamilov told the
UNRCCA: “The preliminary acquaintance with these conventions shows quite
reasonable approaches to resolution of this very complex issue. I hope that our neighbors
will pay attention to this UN's proposal and we will be able to start a mutually interested
dialogue” (Akipress, 2017). Kamilov would like the region to agree on water use,
regulation, and compensation mechanisms.
This is a change from the late president’s tone in 2016, when in a disagreement
over Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam he alarmed the international community with the threat of a
resource war with his comment that “all of this could deteriorate to the point where not
just serious confrontation, but even wars could be the result” (Michel, 2016). Dushanbe
signed with an Italian company, Salini Impregilo, to begin construction, despite the
World Bank’s analysis that the Rogun could bring “large-scale threats to the entire
region” (Michel, 2016).
Another root of the conflict is the inefficient use of the water. Today 90% of the
total available water resources of Central Asia are dedicated to irrigation. Soviet planning
sought to transform Central Asia into a natural resource producer for Moscow’s
industries, and cotton was the choice crop. Water was diverted without consideration to
support the booming irrigation demands on the arid steppes. Consider Uzbekistan alone:
in 1930, there was 530,000 hectares of irrigated land; in 1950, this increased to 650,000
hectares; and by 2005, this had boomed to 1.5 million hectares (Kreutzmann, 2016, 114).
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A large percentage of this output has been, and continues to be, cotton—the “white gold”
of Central Asia. Between 1913 and 1990, Uzbekistan’s cotton output increased tenfold,
and in 2011, Uzbekistan was the sixth largest cotton supplier in the world (Kreutzmann,
2016, 115).
Alisher Ilkhamov (2017) reiterates Kreutzmann’s argument: Central Asia
exacerbates its own water strife through inefficient use. Up to 50% of Uzbekistan’s
irrigation water is lost in its infrastructure networks (Ilkhamov, 2017). More concerning,
however, is the overall water wastefulness. Ilkhamov writes that Turkmenistan consumes
the highest rate of water per capita in the world, at a rate four times higher than the U.S
and thirteen times higher than China. Uzbekistan is the fourth highest consumer of water
per capita; Kyrgyzstan the fifth; Tajikistan the seventh; and Kazakhstan the eleventh
(Ilkhamov, 2017). The exaggerated water use is primarily due to inefficient and leaky
infrastructure.
The instability of the regional actors and the water wastefulness, combined with
the negative impact of the Soviet Union and the legacy of interdependence, heightened by
ethnic conflict and horizontal inequalities, and tied together with the economic
dependency of thirsty cotton, creates a tumultuous hotbed desperately in need of effective
water governance. Unfortunately for Central Asia, their contemporary issues face
extreme escalation with the threat of climate change.

Climate Change in Central Asia
Climate change and its relationship to conflict have been heralded as certainty by
many outlets and underscored as a serious threat to international relations in academia.
60

Solomon (2010) writes that the implications of water scarcity create competition of
interests between ethnic groups, social classes, and geographical habitats, stating that
conflicts are “palpable perils in a growing number of international watersheds in some of
the world’s most combustible regions” (p. 372).
Bernauer and Siegfried (2012) in the Journal of Peace Research specifically
name Central Asia as a region of concern, stating that the existing water management
“has failed” and that disputes have persisted since the collapse of the USSR. Similarly,
Rasool (2015) in the Journal of Central Asian Studies writes that climate change
threatens the Central Asian region with environmental security problems in a complicated
web of fragile state relations. Conflict caused by severe climate change, Bernauer and
Siegfried hypothesize, will be amongst “poorer, less democratic, and politically less
stable” riparians because of their weaker capacity for adaptation (2012). This concern ties
to concerns of resiliency, and the necessary capacity for positive actions in thwarting a
negative trajectory.
Stucker et al. (2014) examined the impacts of climate change and current water
governance in the smaller tributaries of the Syr Darya basin, arguing that insufficient
attention is paid to the less dominant but equally important water sources. They found
that various factors have created an inflection point for management. Stucker et al. write:
“...climate change, population growth, deteriorating irrigation
infrastructure and upstream expansion of irrigated agriculture contribute
significantly to a decreasing and more variable supply of water, an
increasing demand on large water losses, resulting in mounting pressures
on the environment and basin inhabitants” (2014, 63).
Furthermore, the authors found that climate change in Central Asia, though difficult to
model for a variety of reasons, is already happening. There are impacts to regional
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climate in water volume, temperature, and precipitation. Models predict an overall
decrease by 20% in river runoff by 2060 (Korkorin, 2010, and Westphal, 2010, qtd. in
Stucker et al.). Ilkhamov (2017) believes overall decrease will be as high as 30%.
Temperature increases of 0.3 to 1.2*C in the window between 1950 and 2005 have led to
annual precipitation variations across Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Stucker et al., 2014, p.
49). Most alarming is the Stucker et al.’s findings that, since the late 1950s, glacier
volume in the region has shrunk by 15%6 and is only expected to accelerate in the future.
One example is Tajikistan’s Zeravshan Glacier, which, between 1927 and 2009, retreated
2.5km (ZEN qtd. in Stucker et al., 2014, 50). Stucker et al. similarly cite that snow cover
area has decreased by up to 15% since the mid-90s. Of course, both snow cover and
glacier volume contribute directly to long-term water storage capacity in an already
water-stressed region. Ultimately, combined with permafrost melt and warmer
precipitation, climate change threatens regional river volume, and therefore
approximately 80% of the waters in the current Amu Darya and Syr Darya (Stucker et al.,
2014, 50).
As climate change produces shifts in flow patterns, water disputes are likely to
increase in intensity. Kreutzmann (2016) documented the changing characteristics of the
Syr Darya over the past 50 years; snowmelt decreased by 20% while glacier runoff
increased. The lower spring flows and higher autumn flows pose significant threat to the
availability of irrigation water during the growing seasons. This heightens tensions
between the downstream states’ demands for water and the upstream states’ willingness

6

The glacier shrinkage is caused by an annual melt ranging between 0.2 to 1%.
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to provide that water, as well as internal pressures for dictatorships (all C.A. states
excluding Kyrgyzstan) dependent on economic stability. Other ecological concerns
include waterlogging and salinization, implying that quality of water may one day be as
pressing of an issue as the quantity of water (Kreutzmann, 2016, p. 121).
The various literature on climate change in Central Asia is cohesive in many
aspects, but especially in its warnings. Climate change is already happening, and it
threatens the status quo of a volatile region. Additionally, it is closely linked to conflict.
The current elements of Central Asian relations, both productive and unproductive, will
be shaped by the impending hydrologic changes. The governance and agreements over
water need to reflect this threat.

Water Agreements in Central Asia
Governance and agreements over water, however, do not reflect the threat of
climate change. Water in Central Asia is managed hierarchically by transnational,
national, regional, and local actors, who establish and enforce water codes, laws, and
decrees pertaining to use. Many date back to the early and mid-1990s, and were
established based on precedent set during the Soviet Union. That the system is flawed is
no secret. In fact, recognition that the system of agreements is flawed includes statements
from the countries themselves, such as Nazarbayev's blatant statement at the recent water
forum in March 2018: “A major issue [in Central Asia] is problems around water
sharing” (RFERL, March 18, 2018). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, one author describes the
overall implementation on the ground as “legal nihilism” (Abdullaev et al., 2010, 1030).
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“Legal nihilism” may be an overstatement, as there are a few interstate and national
layers of governance.
The primary regional agreement is the Cooperation on Transboundary Water
Management Treaty, signed by the five Central Asian states in 1992 following the
breakup of the USSR to regulate and maintain water allocation throughout the entire Syr
Darya and Amu Darya Basin. Janusz-Pawletta (2015) states that the treaty is regularly
updated to reflect the changing needs of member states and the environmental crises
resultant of Soviet planning, but others disagree. This treaty is critically examined in the
following section.
A separate treaty was signed between the users of the Syr Darya river to create
static allocation of the waters—1% to Kyrgyzstan; 9.2% to Tajikistan; 38.1% to
Kazakhstan, and 51.7% to Uzbekistan—as a security mechanism for the downstream
states (Kreutzmann, 2016, 121). Similarly, in 1998, the Syr Darya riparians signed the
“Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy resource of
the Syr Darya Basin.” This agreement specifically noted “the common interests of the
participating countries and the urgent need for the development of an efficient and
coordinated water regime in the Syr Darya basin, taking into account the problems of the
Aral Sea” (“Agreement…”, 1998). It did not develop a coordinated regime,
unfortunately. Kazakhstan blames Uzbekistan for noncompliance; Uzbekistan denies the
claim; and Kyrgyzstan does not follow the agreement (Mitchell and Lee, 2010, 11).
Another relevant transnational treaty is the Interstate Coordination Water
Commission (ICWC), also established in 1992, as a means of coordinating between
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Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley. ICWC has been
supplemented by Basin Water Organizations (BWOs), whose purposes are to implement
the decisions of the ICWC, and also operate the major irrigation infrastructure—dams,
gates, pumps, canals, etc.—necessary for executing the ICWC’s plans. In 2008, the
riparians updated the treaty governing and envisioning the ICWC, in what became a
modernized framework for governing the shared waters within the greater Aral Sea basin.
This updated 2008 agreement is also critically examined in the following section.
Finally, at a national level, the Central Asian states introduced land reforms
throughout the 1990s to both mitigate the Soviet legacy and revive the agricultural sector.
In doing so, regulatory structures were abolished, transforming water allocation into “a
place of contestation and competition” (Abdullaev et al., 2010, 1030). Water Users
Associations (WUAs) were a result of both INGO and grassroots demands for better
management, operation, and maintenance of waterworks. Unfortunately, they were
bureaucratically established by the thousands and few successfully developed in practice
(Abdullaev et al., 1030). Those that did mobilize continue to face difficulties in managing
water, collecting fees, and operating the irrigation systems (Abdullaev et al., 2010, 1031).
The weak national governance systems further complicate the overarching
implementation of interstate agreements.

Introduction to Case Study Analysis
Central Asia’s water agreements provide an opportune case study for three
reasons. First, the original agreement of 1992 was effectually replaced in 2008 by an
expanded agreement. This allows for cross-examination to identify the additions that
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riparians perceived to be of importance.7 Second, the updated water agreement satisfies
many of the provisions identified in the literature as important for resiliency to climate
change—yet, and thirdly, the agreement is hardly heralded as a successful transboundary
river agreement, and is unlikely to withstand the heightened pressures of climate change.
Though there are multiple agreements that could be analyzed through a governance lens
in Central Asia, the 1992 and 2008 Agreements were selected due to their similar subject
matter and matching signatory countries (see Appendix B for texts of the agreements).
The 1992 agreement was written following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and
its language reflects the hurry to maintain a degree of interdependence. The 2008
agreement was written following regional and global concern over the Aral Sea crisis, as
well as during the economic recession, and its language reflects the region’s
environmental and financial concerns. In the following sections, we will analyze and
compare the two agreements in light of the provision list; analyze the 2008 Agreement in
light of the provision list; and compare the two agreements to identify the provisions that
the Central Asian riparians added to improve their relations. We will then examine
whether the provisions have had significant impact in improving the resiliency of the
water agreements. Finally, we will discuss the implications of the findings.

1992 Agreement
Following the USSR’s break up, the preexisting interdependent economies and
infrastructure of the Central Asian riparians were left suddenly derailed. The 1992
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Water Resource Management and
7

It is important to note methodologically that the agreements analyzed are the English translations. One is
taken directly from the ICWC website, and the other is sourced from the University of Texas. The Russian
language versions of the agreements were not evaluated.
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Conservation of Interstate Sources (hereafter “1992 Agreement”) reflected the need for
re-established cooperation. The agreement was designed “based on the historical
community of peoples living on the territory” and “recognizing the unbreakable
interdependence and relationship of the interests of all the Republics,” in pursuit of an
“organized solutions of the problems of joint management of water of interstate sources”
(1992 Agreement). In other words, the riparians recognized that independence was not an
end to interdependence.
The 1992 Agreement has a significant portion of the provision list incorporated
within its text. The following section will examine the findings from Table 2.1 to discuss
the implications of provisions present and absent from the agreement.
Table 2.1. The 1992 Agreement Compared to the Provision List

1992 Agreement Comparison to Provision List
Present in Agreement

Absent from Agreement

ID

Name

1992
Article

ID

Name

SM2

Prioritization of Use

Intro.,
Art. 10

PrE4

Communication Channels

PsE2

Recognition of Rights

Art. 1,
3, 9

PrE5

Institutional Learning

PsM1

Power Balancing

Art. 2,
6, 11

PrE6

Prior Notice & Consultation

PrE3

Financial, Technical
Cooperation

Art. 4, 9 PsM3

Reframing Value of Water

PsM2

Population Pressures

Art. 4

Reciprocal Resource Trade

PsE1

Transparency, Trustbuilding

Art. 5
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SE1

PrM3

Monitoring

Art. 5, 8

PrE1

Intergovernmental
Institutions

Art. 7, 9

PrE2

Vertical, Horizontal
Integration

Art. 7

PrM5

Flexibility Mechanisms

Art. 8

SE2

Environmental
Considerations

Art. 10

SM1

Addressing Hydrologic
Variability

Art. 11

PrM1

Enforcement

Art. 12

PrM2

Dispute Resolution

Art. 13

PrM4

Amendment

Art. 14

1992 Agreement Analysis
There are several aspects of the 1992 Agreement worth highlighting. First, and
quite noteworthy, is that the first five articles address psychological interests. Articles 1
and 3 recognize riparians water rights; article 2 balances power; article 4 recognizes
population pressure; and article 5 attempts to establish transparency for trust. As Moore
explains, psychological interests are tied to relationships, fears, and aspirations (2003).
Consider the complex regional influences in Central Asia in 1992—a time of ethnic
violence, multiple regime changes, civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the breakup
of the USSR, the rise of religious extremism—and the uncertainty prompting the
emphasis on psychological interests is self-apparent.
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This uncertainty is overwhelmingly evident in the language around water rights;
references to existing use and equal rights to the interstate resource are frequent. And yet,
for the riparians at the time of signing, rights were a new concept: prior to the Soviet
occupation, there had been neither population nor industry great enough to outmatch
supply, and during occupation water had been a shared resource for the fulfillment of
Moscow’s imperialist dreams.
Second, the articles themselves are overall short and absent of actionable items.
The longest articles, articles 7 through 10, are each two sentences comprised of about
eight lines of text. The two shortest articles are 16 and 18 words, respectively—or
roughly the length of this sentence. The brevity translates to ambiguity. Little consensus
was likely to be drawn from something as open-ended as article 4, which states: “During
extremely dry years a special separate decision shall be taken on the problems of water
supply to the regions of acute water deficiency.” And, in a time of true drought, article 4
is more likely to exacerbate tensions than relieve it, as its definition provides no structure
for proper action.
Third, and of little surprise, references are absent to climate change and infrequent
to the environment. The environment is mentioned in the opening remarks, in a reference
to the “mitigation and stabilization of ecological stresses,” stemming from “water
resource depletion.” The “rational use and protection” of water is further established in
article 1, and an expectation for technical cooperation on the problem of the Aral Sea’s
desiccation is laid out in articles 4 and 10. However, the overall taste of the agreement is
prioritization of water use that benefits the economic growth and agricultural demands of
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the region.8 Again, this prioritization reflects the region’s political climate, but also the
overall philosophy of natural resource use in the Soviet Union and, more broadly,
throughout most of the 19th and 20th centuries. Natural resources, including water, were
to be consumed, used, and refined in order to create economic benefit.
Finally, the psychological emphasis skimmed over two important factors:
communication and enforcement mechanisms. Communication is implied generically in a
few articles, such as in article 5 where riparians agree to “facilitate wide information
exchange,” and in article 7, “having envisaged quarterly meetings.” But the agreement
lacks robust expectations for how, when, and about what parties will communicate.
Similarly, enforcement is implied generically in article 12: “The parties agreed to
elaborate within 1992 the mechanism of economic and such other responsibility for
violation of the agreed regime and limits of water use.” However, there is no evidence
whether parties ever agreed upon enforcement measures in the final two months of
1992—the agreement was signed in September.
Combined, this analysis gives context to the times, but also to the articles of
agreement and the motivations behind them. Equally important, the analysis gives insight
into why, sixteen years later, the riparians would essentially rewrite the 1992 Agreement
in plainer, clearer, and better-defined terms.

8

See Bullet #1, Bullet #4, Articles 6, 8, and 10 for supporting evidence
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2008 Agreement
Following sixteen years of ineffectual water governance in the Aral Sea Basin
(see Central Asia Conflict Timeline, Appendix A, for details of conflict), the five
riparians met in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to reword their resource relations. The 2008 Statute
of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (hereafter “2008
Agreement”) is significantly longer and more robust than the 1992 Agreement, almost
certainly designed to fill in the holes in operation under the former understanding. The
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) was originally established in
1993, and conceptualized within the 1992 Agreement, to manage the allocation of water
in the Aral Sea Basin. However, the 2008 Agreement significantly reworded the
relationship between the riparians and the expectations of cooperative management.
The 2008 Agreement also has a significant portion of the provision list
incorporated within its text. The following section will examine the findings from Table
2.2 to discuss the implications of provisions present and absent from the agreement.
Table 2.2. The 2008 Agreement Compared to the Provision List

2008 Agreement Comparison to Provision List
Present in Agreement

Absent in Agreement

ID

Name

2008 Article

ID

Name

PrE1

Intergovernmental
Institutions

Art. 1.1, 1.2,
1.3, 1.4, 4.3,
5.1, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2

PrM5

Flexibility
Mechanisms

PsM3

Reframing Value of
Water

Art. 1.5

PsM2

Population Pressure

SM1

Addressing

Art. 2.1, 2.3,

PsE2

Recognition of Rights
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Hydrologic Variability 4.1, 4.2
PrE2

Vertical, Horizontal
Integration

Art. 2.2, 2.11,
5.2

PrE3

Financial, Technical
Cooperation

Art. 2.3, 2.7,
2.8, 2.9, 2.16,
2.19, 3.7, 3.8,
5.4, 5.6, 5.7,
5.11

SM2

Prioritization of Use

Art. 2.12, 5.5

SE2

Environmental
Consideration

Art. 2.4, 2.5,
2.13, 5.5

SE1

Reciprocal Resource
Trade

Art. 2.6, 2.12

PrM1

Enforcement

Art. 2.6

PrM3

Monitoring

Art. 2.7, 2.10,
5.1, 5.6, 5.7

PsE1

Transparency, Trustbuilding

Art. 2.10, 5.6,
5.7

PrE4

Communication
Channels

Art. 2.14, 3.2,
3.3, 3.10, 4.6,
5.6, 5.7

PrE5

Institutional Learning

Art. 2.15, 5.1,
5.8

PrM2

Dispute Resolution

Art. 2.17

PrE6

Prior Notice &
Consultation

Art. 2.18

PsM1

Power Balancing

Art. 3.4, 4.4, 5.4

PrM4

Amendment

7.1
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2008 Agreement Analysis
Like its predecessor, the 2008 Agreement has several noteworthy elements to
explore. First, and most obvious in analysis, is the remarkable emphasis on financial and
technical cooperation. Elements of the provision PrE3 were evident in twelve distinct
clauses across the majority of sections. Compare, for example, clause 2.3, which outlines
“planning and control of large interstate reservoir operation regimes,” with clause 3.8,
which designates that the Commission may “[allocate] special interstate investment funds
for shared financing of work related to regional water sector development.” The
agreement is overall thorough in its consideration of where, and of what, technical and
financial collaboration is worthwhile and needed in the region.
In stark opposition, the agreement has no references to water rights. The reasons
for this may be twofold. First, the agreement creates the ICWC according to the 1992
Agreement, which was very articulate in outlining water rights. It may have been that
further expression of rights was redundant. Second, the atmosphere at the time of signing
was polar to that of 1992. Where the former agreement was signed in fear and
uncertainty, the latter agreement was signed in the momentum of cooperation and
improvement to the status quo.
Unsurprisingly, considering that much of the 2008 Agreement is dedicated to
revamping and formalizing the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC),
the agreement is heavy on institutional elements required for its operation and growth.
The agreement has nine clauses specifically addressing its nature as an intergovernmental
institution, including the majority of the opening section. For example, the first two
clauses define the role of the ICWC in conjunction with the International Fund for Aral
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Sea Saving (IFAS), a separate regional water treaty focused primarily on the Aral Sea
crisis, and the following two clauses define its activity “following the principles of
collectivity and mutual respect of parties' interests” (Clause 1.4).
Another interesting component of the 2008 Agreement is its seven clauses for
communication, in what is likely a direct response to the communication void of the 1992
Agreement. These clauses range from logistical details like clause 3.10, which establishes
Russian as the working language, and 4.6, which waives visa requirements for
individuals travelling for the ICWC, to more facilitative clauses like clause 2.14, which
establishes a joint program for early warning in emergencies and disasters related to
hydro-structures.
Finally, the 2008 Agreement added reciprocal resource trade in Section Two,
which outlines the main objectives of the ICWC. Central Asia has attempted—with
mixed success—to trade energy from downstream riparians for water from upstream
riparians. Article 2.6 delegates to the ICWC the “preparation of recommendations...on the
development of uniform pricing policy and possible losses compensation mechanism
related to shared water and energy use.” In simpler words, this article implies that the
region would self-police resource trade according the prices and punishments established
by the ICWC. Article 2.12 states that “reconciliation of releases from reservoirs for
irrigation needs...with consideration of hydropower generation requirements” is likewise
a priority objective of the ICWC. Article 2.12 is, essentially, the process-oriented half of
Article 2.6, which discusses the pricing and legal frameworks of energy and water.
The 2008 Agreement was written in a different era than the 1992 Agreement, and
the tone is reflected in both the political and environmental context of the agreement. The
74

question, however, is whether the 2008 Agreement is truly a more resilient agreement
than the 1992 Agreement. At first glance, it appears almost certainly superior—the 2008
Agreement has more substance, more depth to the clauses, and a greater breadth of
coverage. Yet, in the decade since its conception, conflict has continued to simmer over
water and water-related issues. Is it truly resilient?
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Section Three
Oh, I have oft been too anxious for rivers
To leave it to them to get out of their valleys.
Robert Frost, “Too Anxious for Rivers”

Comparison of the 1992 Agreement and the 2008 Agreement
A strength of the Central Asia case study is that the differences between the 1992
and 2008 Agreements allows for tracking the evolution of the riparians’ relations.
Provisions that were added, removed, or ignored reflect elements that the riparians selfidentified as important and necessary changes. Furthermore, it allows for an apples-toapples comparison of basin management before and after changes in the articulation of
basin management. This will help to clarify the role that provisions play in aiding
resilient basin management, as well as the future role that provisions can play in
responding to climate change.
The following section will identify and weight the significance of changes
between 1992 and 2008 in three ways. First, a textual analysis will discuss content
changes in the two agreements. Second, a textual analysis will identify the types of words
used, changes in the types of words used, and the possible reasons behind changes. Third,
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by weighting the frequency of words as relative to the word count of the agreements, we
will identify the relative importance of selected themes to the riparians at the time of
signing. The three-part analysis will then enlighten a discussion of how much words
matter in contrast to implementation and riparian relations.

Textual Analysis
A textual analysis addresses the “content, structure, and functions” of a message,
or the way that words interact to deliver the purpose of a communication (Frey et al.,
1999). There are four subdivisions to a textual analysis (Frey et al., 1999). Rhetorical
criticism is the analysis of persuasion in a text; content analysis is the identification of
characteristics in the text; interaction analysis is the analysis of communication between
communicators; and performances studies is the identification of the aesthetics of a text.
The following textual analysis focuses on content analysis, as the study of the messages’
characteristics is most relevant to the study of provisions.
The predominant difference between the 1992 Agreement and the 2008
Agreement boils down to size. The original agreement is a mere 857 words—not
including the title and signatories—with 14 articles. The 2008 Agreement, in contrast, is
a 250% size increase, with 2,138 words—not including the title and signatories—with
seven sections and 59 clauses [articles]. The size difference directly influences the
following analyses. Comparing the 1992 Agreement to Provision List (Table 2.1) to the
2008 Agreement Provision List (Table 2.2) highlights the differences between topics that
were significant at the time of signing and provisions that are absent from the
agreements. The following subsections will analyze differences accordingly.
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Textual Analysis: Topics of Significance
Though broadly discussed in the individual analyses above, there are four topics
worth featuring in a side-by-side comparison. These include the types of interests
emphasized in the two agreements, the two shifts in emphasis, and the additions of
communication and institutional learning.
First, there is a definite procedural-interest orientation in the 2008 Agreement, as
opposed to the psychological-interest orientation in the 1992 Agreement. Take, for
example, the first six articles of the 1992 Agreement: articles 1 and 3 address recognition
of rights (PsE2), articles 2 and 6 addresses power balancing (PsM1), article 4 addresses
population pressures (PsM2), and article 5 addresses transparency and trust-building
(PsE1). Conversely, the first four clauses [articles] of the 2008 Agreement address
intergovernmental institutions (PrE1), and then soon thereafter address vertical and
horizontal integration (prE2) and financial and technical cooperation (PrE3).
Comparatively, a procedural interest does not come up until article 4 (PrE3) in the 1992
agreement. In the 2008 agreement, reframing the value of water (PsM3) comes up in
clause 1.5, but otherwise psychological interests are absent until transparency and trustbuilding in clause 2.10. Thus, the emphasis on procedural elements represents a shift in
the content of the 2008 and 1992 Agreements.
Second, the 2008 Agreement underscores a financial and technical cooperation
(PrE3) only implied in the 1992 Agreement. There are 12 clauses in the 2008 Agreement
that mention interstate technical and/or financial cooperation—nearly as many articles as
comprised the 1992 Agreement. Conversely, there are only two articles in the 1992
Agreement regarding technical and financial cooperation. The cooperative motivations
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that cause the psychological-to- procedural reorientation may have also influenced this
shift. The first agreement is focused on water rights, water allocation, and water use, all
of which are internally-oriented foci for the benefit of the fledgling nation-states. The
second agreement is more outward-oriented, with language reflecting the shared and
interdependent relationship between riparians. Cooperation is naturally a theme that
accompanies an outward orientation.
Third, the 2008 Agreement shifts much more towards consideration of the
environment than the 1992 Agreement. This is of little surprise, considering that climate
change and environmentalism had begun to plant deep roots in the upper echelons of
global governance by the mid-2000, emerging in rhetoric at the highest levels. In the
1992 Agreement, mentions of the environment or ecosystems are directly or implicitly
linked to economic and social advantages. In the 2008 Agreement, the frequency of
mentions and the tone towards the topic changes to reflect the looming environmental
crisis of Central Asia. That being said, the provisions within the 2008 Agreement are not
specifically framed as a response to the environment, but rather as conscientious of the
environment.
Fourth, the riparians added communication channels and institutional learning
elements to the 2008 Agreement, in contrast to the brevity of the 1992 Agreement. The
2008 Agreement has seven clauses regarding communication, compared to zero in the
1992 Agreement, and three regarding institutional learning, compared to zero in the 1992
Agreement. The changes reflect what was likely the actual situation, in which
communication and feedback-loops organically developed through trial and error. For
example, consider the clause establishing Russian as the working language of the ICWC.
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There is no language outlined in the 1992 Agreement, likely because former working
relations had been determined by the greater Russified framework of the USSR. When
the next generation of officials rose into the ICWC, however, they brought with them
new frameworks of national identity and linguistic differences; hence, a language clause
was necessary for framing the communication of the ICWC.

Textual Analysis: Overlooked Provisions
What is present in the texts is only half the picture; just as important to
understanding and evaluating the agreements is what is absent. Absent text can imply
intentionality, subconscious dispositions, accidental overlooks, or ignorance towards the
importance of a clause. However, what was most surprising during the analysis of the
1992 and 2008 Agreements was that no provision from the provision list was entirely
overlooked. Though a handful of provisions were left off of each agreement, the entire
list is represented between both agreements. Therefore, this section analyzes “overlooked
provisions” to be areas where provisions are too weak to improve resiliency.
The first of these overlooked provisions is enforcement. Clause 2.6 in the 2008
Agreement says that the ICWC will prepare “possible losses compensation mechanisms”
for shared water use, suggesting that a noncompliant riparian would be obligated to
compensate the injured riparian for losses. Likewise, article 12 in the 1992 Agreement
says that the parties commit to create a “mechanism of economic and such other
responsibility for the violation of the agreed regime and limits,” but there is no formal
agreement indicating that any such mechanism was created. The textual hints of
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enforcement suggest that the Central Asian states understand its importance, but are
unwilling politically and sovereignly to commit to the risk that accompanies enforcement.
Flexibility is also weakly represented within the agreements. The sole flexibility
mechanism is in article 8 of the 1992 Agreement, which says the future ICWC will
annually evaluate water use limits and actual water availability in order to allow for
adaptation, or “correction,” at the water reservoirs, allowing some degree for
implementing short-term adaptations. This sole provision underscores the weakness of
flexibility in the agreements for two reasons: first, the flexibility mechanism is solely
limited to adapting water allocation from water reservoirs; second, the flexibility is
limited to the seasonality of water releases, thereby limiting year-round flexibility. Even
more unfortunate is the flexibility within the 2008 Agreement. Though there is emphasis
on collaboration, cooperation, and coordination, the new agreement has no mention of a
mechanism specifically for adapting to unforeseen circumstances. This arrangement,
especially when compared to the U.S.-Mexico minutes process, in which riparians can
create self-governing provisions as needed, or when compared to the literature on the
need for flexibility in basin management, limits innovative adaptability in Central Asia.
Third, and alarming through the lens of resiliency, are the weak dispute resolution
mechanisms expressed in both agreements. Article 13 of the 1992 Agreement delegates
“all disputable matters” to the heads of the water agencies for resolution. Similarly,
clause 2.17 of the 2008 Agreement delegates “disputes and disagreements” for
“investigation” to the ICWC, with conflict escalation vaguely assigned to “a special
commission to establish facts, as well as setting procedures for liabilities.” Taken
together, the contradictory dispute resolution mechanisms are even less coherent.
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Syntactical Analysis
The syntactical analysis analyzed specific units of the messaging through a focus
on words and word choice (Frey et al., 1999). The hypothesis of the analysis was that the
frequency of words used in each of the agreements would reveal differences in the
ultimate purpose of the respective documents (this hypothesis is further expanded in the
following section, in which words are weighted according to the length of the document
by percentage). A list of fifty words, each with connotations identified as relevant to the
provision list, were compared. The selected words have enhancement, mitigation,
procedural, psychological, substantive, or resiliency connotations, and include nouns,
adjectives, and verbs.
The methodology of this analysis began with using translations directly from the
ICWC site.9 These translations were not the translations used in the textual and thematic
analyses above, but were selected under the assumption that the ICWC translators have
similar communication goals and may have utilized similar words. To balance vocabulary
differences, however, the author identified and paired synonyms together (i.e. Shared and
Joint) to better represent both agreements. Additionally, the words within the ICWC—
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination—were excluded from word counts when
within the name of the ICWC.
The findings speak to the character differences of the agreements. In the chart
below (See Table 2.3), word findings of significance are highlighted: shared / joint,
international, interstate, shall / will / must, environmental / ecological, flexible /

9

See: http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute4.htm; http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute1.htm
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flexibility, law / legal, economic, develop-(-ment, -ed, -ing, -s), information, improv-(ement, -ed, -ing, -es), rational use / quotas. These words were highlighted because of
their connotations to the content of the agreement or because of their frequency.
Shared / Joint: This pairing is noteworthy because it shows the dramatic shift in
expectations from the riparians. The 1992 Agreement used the terms a total of 6 times,
whereas the 2008 Agreement used the pairing 24 times. This underscores the analysis that
the 1992 Agreement was inward-focused, and the 2008 Agreement was outward focused.
International / Interstate: The use of these words also shifts dramatically between
the two agreements. The pair are employed 19 times in the 2008 Agreement, versus only
4 uses of interstate in the 1992 Agreement. Like shared and joint, the use of international
and interstate reflects the outward momentum of the 2008 Agreement.
Shall / Will / Must: The writing style employed by each agreement framed
expectations of riparians through differing strength of language. In the 1992 Agreement,
the words shall, will, and must were used 11 times, whereas “will” was used only once in
the 2008 Agreement. Instead, the 2008 Agreement framed the expectations of the ICWC
through various verb usage, which gives a softer tone overall to the document.
Environmental / Ecological: Mirroring many of the findings above, the use of
environmental and ecological was higher in the 2008 Agreement than the 1992
Agreement. This also reinforces the textual analysis above that the global political sphere
was much more contentious of environmental impacts in 2008 than in the 1990s.
Flexible / Flexibility: The observation that neither agreement employed the term
flexible or flexibility, including synonyms, represents a concerning trend in Central Asian
water management. Mechanisms for flexibility are critical to regional resiliency.
83

Law / Legal: The 2008 Agreement used law and legal 4 times, whereas the 1992
Agreement never did. This may reflect an interest in engaging with outside standards and
organizations—the outward orientation—that as absent in negotiations in the 1990s. It
also employs an external standard as a means of determining fairness.
Economic: Both agreements used the term economic with relative frequency: 5
uses in the 2008 Agreement, and 6 uses in the 1992 Agreement. The frequency reflects
the national priorities, identified in the preamble of the 1992 Agreement, of growing their
economies, raising the standard of living, building up infrastructure for development, and
improving overall GDP. Regional development has improved in the past quarter century,
as exemplified by GDP changes, but not at a universal rate.
Information / Scientific / Monitor / Research / Facts: These five terms are paired
together because of the connotations that accompany them, connotations of truth-finding
and transparency. The group was employed 14 times in the 2008 Agreement, but only 4
times in the 1992 Agreement. The implications are that Central Asian riparians believe
scientifically-grounded evidence is a fair standard upon which to make decisions.
Develop- / Improve-: These verbs represent forward momentum, continuous
engagement, and critical consideration of process. To develop and improve requires
cooperation and communication when things go well and when things go poorly. It
should be of little surprise, then, that the words were used 22 times in the 2008
Agreement and 0 times in the 1992 Agreement. It is a stark example of the limited scope
in 1992, as well as the positivity in 2008.
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Table 2.3 Syntactical Analysis of Selected Words in 2008 and 1992 Agreements

Syntactical Analysis of 2008 and 1992 Agreements
Word/s

# in
2008

# in
1992

Word/s

# in
2008

# in
1992

Shared / Joint

18 / 6

1/5

Rights

1

3

International

9

0

Interstate

10

4

Protection

6

6

Rational Use

0

4

Equal / Parity

1/0

2/2

Equitable

2

1

Proportion-

1

0

Ensure

4

3

Cooperation

2

0

Respect-

1

1

Shall / Will /
Must

0/1/0

8/2/1

Water

66

47

Management

10

3

Responsibility

2

1

Releases

7

3

Together

5

1

Problems /
Issues

2/2

2/2

Mitigate

0

1

Environmental

4

0

Ecological

2

1

Allocation

2

3

Flexible /
Flexibility

0

0

Dispute

1

1

Users

3

1

Compliance

0

1

Law- / Legal

1/3

0

Economic

5

6

Stabilize

0

1
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Liability

0

1

Coordinat-

6

3

Social

1

0

Establish (verb)

4

1

Established
(adj.)

3

3

Develop-

15

0

Facts

1

0

Policy / Rules

5/0

2/1

Scientific

4

2

Research

3

1

Information

5

1

Monitor

1

0

Improve-

7

0

Strict-

0

2

Use

17

14

Regulation

2

2

Control

4

1

Interests / Needs

1/3

3/1

Integrate-

1

2

Quotas

0

4

Scaled Word Frequency
My analytical hypothesis purported that analyzing the frequency of words in each
of the documents would reveal differences in the purpose of the respective documents, by
examining actual versus relative use of certain words. While the syntactical analysis
revealed insight into the changes between the documents, conclusions about the purpose
of the documents are implicit. This final analysis scales word use to word count, to give a
proportionate picture of how frequent a word was in comparison to the overall amount of
words within each document. The methodology was drawn from frequency analysis,
which studies the frequency of words and phrases within a given context. To scale the
usage, the frequency of the word was divided by the agreement word count, and then
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multiplied by 1000 to give a full number. So, for example, if “word” has been used eight
times in this paragraph of 135 words, then the actual frequency is 0.059%. Multiplied by
1000, that percentage changes to 59.2, which is easier for comparison.
The scaled list is comprised of key words from the syntactical analysis above, but
reframes their comparative significance (see Table 2.4). Take, for example, the use of the
word “interstate.” The 2008 Agreement uses the word 10 times, and the 1992 Agreement
uses the word 4 times. However, when the frequency is divided by the overall word
count, the scaled frequency of the word is equal. The 2008 Agreement employed it more
in actual terms, but not in relative terms. Similarly, consider the use of the word
“economic.” It was used 5 times in the 2008 Agreement and 6 times in the 1992
Agreement. The scaled use, however, implies that the word was much more important in
the 1992 Agreement, as it is three times more frequent in relative terms. Finally, the use
of shared and joint is not as imbalanced as the syntactical analysis first suggests. Though
much more frequent in actual terms in the 2008 Agreement, when scaled to consider
overall word count, it is only 1.6x more frequent in relative terms than the 1992
Agreement.
The implications of scaled word frequency raise new questions about the
significance of wording. Does content matter as much as intent? Does content matter as
much mechanisms for amending or adding content? Does the length of an agreement,
instead of word choice, increase the likelihood of an agreement’s success?
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Table 2.4 Scaled Frequency of Word Use for Comparison between Agreements

Word/s

2008 Use
Scaled

1992 Use
Scaled

Comparative Frequency

Shared / Joint

11.2 7

International

4.2 0

-

Interstate

4.7 4.7

Equal

Shall / Will / Must

0.5 12.8

25.6x more frequent in 1992

Environmental

1.9 0

-

Law / Legal

1.9 0

-

Economic

2.3 7

3x more frequent in 1992

Develop-

1.6x more frequent in 2008

7 0

-

Information

2.3 1.2

1.9x more frequent in 2008

Improve-

3.3 0

-

Analyses Discussion
The following three sections will probe deeper into the implications and
discussions stemming from the analyses. The first section will overview expected and
unexpected findings, to raise the question of whether provisions are significant to a
treaty’s success. The second section will specifically address whether the provisions
impacted the resiliency of the 1992 and 2008 Agreements. The third and final section will
more broadly discuss the problems and constraints of the analysis and the hypothesis.
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Analyses Discussion: Expected and Unexpected Findings
The analysis of the 1992 and 2008 Agreements highlighted findings both
expected and unexpected. On one hand, the agreements reflected expected changes in
size and tone. Regarding size, it is of little surprise that the 2008 Agreement was larger
and more robust than its predecessor. Had the 1992 Agreement been sufficient, there
would have been no need for an updated agreement, as the 1992 Agreement’s amendment
mechanism would have been appropriate for minor changes in governance. Therefore, the
size increase of the 2008 Agreement is a logical finding. Regarding tone, the historical
context of the 1992 Agreement established the expected tone, as extreme and volatile
shifts in governance and infrastructure impacted the inward-focus of negotiators. The
2008 Agreement, conversely, was created in a time of relative regional stability.
In terms of unexpected findings, the breadth of provisions and the relative
frequency of words illumined the surprising and complex nature of agreement creation.
First, it was surprising that the full breadth of the provision list was incorporated within
the two agreements. The weight of this finding will be discussed in the next section, to
determine whether the inclusion of the provisions has direct impact the resiliency of the
agreement. Second, the relative frequency of words, versus the actual frequency of
words, was surprising. Throughout the early stages of the analysis, it was easy to assume
that the findings would support the superiority of the 2008 Agreement. However, the
relative frequency of words suggested that the 1992 Agreement prioritized many themes
as much, and even more, than the 2008 Agreement.
However, the most significant extraction from the analysis is the implication that
the content of an agreement matters less than its implementation. Though logical, the
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underlying assumption has been that content determines the success of an agreement—
that the right provisions will determine the resiliency of an agreement. If the treaties
combined included the entirety of the provision list, and if the treaties independently
included the majority of the provision list, then why is Central Asia a hotbed of latent
water conflict? The next section will continue this discussion, with a deeper examination
of the impact of provisions on resiliency and a discussion of how success in this case
study is measured.

Analyses Discussion: Did the Provisions Impact the Resiliency of the Agreements?
The agreement analyses raised a distressing question about the impact of
provisions, and even content more generally, on the success of an agreement. In this
context, the goal is resiliency to climate change impacts and success is the measured
ability of a basin’s management structures to withstand negative trajectories. In
evaluating the impact of provisions on the resiliency of the 1992 and 2008 Agreements,
the success of the Central Asian case study is surmised implicitly and defined explicitly.
Implicit success is determined through content trends in literature, media, and NGOs, and
their opinions on Central Asian water conflict and management. Explicit success is
determined by comparing factors of Central Asia to indicators of resiliency (Crow, 2018).
Unfortunately, the findings from both suggest that success in Central Asia is far from a
benchmark for provisions.
In the 25 years that Central Asia has managed its water resources through
agreements and the ICWC, a large body of literature has remarked on its overall
inefficiencies. In 2008—prior to the 2008 Agreement—Beatrice Mosello wrote, “The
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imposition of a half-hearted version of Soviet central planning on the fractious Central
Asian states has not proven a recipe for success” (2008, 161). Mosello later quotes the
International Crisis Group, who in 2002 complained that the ICWC was “a club for water
officials that makes no real decisions” (ICG, 2002, 9, qtd in B. Mosello, 2008, 162).
Among other concerns, Mosello underscores issues with the pre-2008 ICWC such as its
possible bias stemming from its headquarters in Uzbekistan, its weak institutional
capacity and technical expertise, its limited budget,10 and the “state of paralysis” drawn
from its consensus-based authority (2008, 163).
More recent articles continue to reiterate the shortcomings of the ICWC and basin
management in Central Asia overall. An article by Yegor Volovik for the UNDP in 2011
identified six major gaps in regional agreements. His report reads similarly to the
comparative analysis on the 1992 and 2008 Agreements above, identifying gaps in
monitoring and evaluation, climate change issues, information exchanges, enforcement
mechanisms, the water-energy dilemma for upstream riparians, and, most tellingly, a
“regional cooperation and coordination platform” (Volovik, 2011, 23). Volovik writes,
“There have been some attempts...to establish a cooperation/coordination platform to
discuss water related issues but they have not materialized in effective legislative,
institutional, and economic means for cooperation” (2011, 23). The question stemming
directly from Volovik’s analysis is what—if not a cooperation/coordination platform—is
the ICWC? And if nothing effective has materialized, then why has the ICWC failed in

10

Mosello writes that only Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan fulfill their financial obligations.
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its mandate “to deal with joint solution of issues related to shared water management”?
(2008 Agreement).
Success can also be measured through factors associated with community
resiliency (Crow, 2018, see Table 2.5). These factors include infrastructure and services,
community competence and agency, equal access to resources, values and beliefs that
benefit the overall community, and governance. The theory is that these factors are both
indicators and impetus for resiliency; if a system has a strong representation of these
factors, then it is more resilient. However, when these categories are placed beside the
Central Asia case study for comparison, it is evident that resiliency is not a guiding
concept in water management.
Table 2.5. Factors Associated with Community Resiliency (Source: Crow, 2018)
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For example, resiliency has been tied to well-functioning infrastructure and
services (Buikstra et al., 2010, see Table 2.5). Yet, as discussed in the conflict analysis
above, the crumbling infrastructure installed by the Soviet Union loses up to half of all
irrigation water in Uzbekistan (Ilkhamov, 2017) and is serviced by a weak network of
water user associations (Anarbekov and Mukhamedova, 2017, 16). Similarly, equal
access to resources is a factor in resiliency (Magis, 2010; see Table 2.5). Yet, the weak
infrastructure and embroiled tensions of ethnicity in the Ferghana Valley create real and
perceived horizontal inequalities between groups (Kreutzmann, 2016).
Community competence and agency—meaning the existing ability of a
community to collaborate in flexible and innovative ways for mutual gain—is another
factor associated with resiliency (Norris et al., 2008, see Table 2.5). In Central Asian
border communities, however, communities have frequently forsaken collaboration for
conflict escalation, including frequent violence (see Appendix A for a timeline of Central
Asian water conflict). Similarly, another factor for resiliency is community values and
beliefs, or the norms that promote community wellbeing (Kulig, Hegney, and Edge,
2010, see Table 2.5). The historical quarrels amidst border communities, however, point
to weak or nonexistent resiliency in the Aral Sea Basin.
Finally, multiple authors (Gooch et al., 2010; Kulig et al., 2013; MatarritaCascante and Trejos, 2013; Maclean et al., 2014; see Table 2.5) underscore the
importance of governance and local institutional arrangements in determining resiliency.
Resilient governance is defined as “robust, responsive, and adaptive” (Crow, 2018,
emphasis added). Yet, these adjectives are rare, if not wholly absent, from discussions on
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Central Asia’s water governance. On the contrary, the system has been described as
“legal nihilism” (Abdullaev et al., 2010, 1030).
The implication of this discussion is that the provisions failed to provide
resiliency in the 1992 and 2008 Agreements. The analysis implies that even when the
content of an agreement satisfies the provisions identified in the literature, the
implementation of the agreement—or lack thereof—may rupture the momentum of
cooperation, flexibility, stability, and other factors foundational to resiliency, which were
established in the treaty’s language through provisions. In other words, implementation is
conditional for the success of provisions. Now the question is, if the perfect agreement is
insufficient for creating climate change resiliency, what will?

Analyses Discussion: Discussion of Provisions and Research
The research behind provisions and the case study were thorough but far from
comprehensive, leaving space for critique within the findings and outcomes, and also for
areas of future research. First, provisions raise potential questions about their
interconnected nature, relevance to vertical tiers of governance, and completeness.
Second, the case study did not consider the influence of major external pressures, power
between riparians, or the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism in its conclusion
that provisions failed to provide resiliency. And finally, the inclusion of implementation
as a provision was not considered until the conclusion of the analyses.
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Provisions
Regarding provisions, the interconnected nature of provisions was not considered
in the analysis of the agreements’ effectiveness. For example, Keohane and Martin
(1995) argued that enforcement should be coupled with monitoring to be more effective
(qtd. in Greet et al., 2013). There may be strong connections between certain provisions
that negate or minimize the impact if not paired together. If so, weak basin management
may be tied to the combinations of content in the agreements, which would undermine
the above conclusion that implementation is conditional for the success of provisions.
Further research is needed to determine whether the provision list should be reformed
into a provision network, with linked provisions critical to the one another’s success.
Provisions were also assumed to be universal within a basin. The case study did
not consider that some provisions may be more relevant at different tiers of governance.
If vertical integration extends from the United Nations to the household, then it is logical
to assume that some provisions will have more or less relevance along the continuum of
governance. As such, further research is needed in identifying the impact of provisions
within vertical integration.
Additionally, an assumption in applying the provision list to the case study was
that the provision list is complete, fully representing the substantive, psychological, and
procedural needs of parties. It is possible that the provision list is incomplete. If so, the
Central Asian case study may have significant holes in its 1992 and 2008 Agreements,
which could explain its poor record of water management.
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Case Study
Regarding the case study, there are two potential weaknesses in the analysis and
conclusion. First, the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism was identified, but no
conclusion was drawn that determined whether or not enforcement is critical to the
success of an agreement. Further research is needed on the significance of enforcement
and its relationship to compliance. Assuming that enforcement is a critical provision, it
may explain why Central Asia has weak implementation of water governance.
Second, the case study did not consider the element of power in riparian
interactions. In the US-Mexico Commission, for example, stability in the flexibility
mechanism may be due to the huge power imbalance – the US, as both the upstream
riparian and the global hegemon, dwarfs the capabilities and desire of Mexico to disrupt
cooperation. In Central Asia, on the other hand, the upstream riparians are Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, both of whom are poorer and smaller than downstream riparians
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The latter riparians have large export-economies in oil and
cotton, respectively, with GDPs well above those of the former riparians. Some authors
have addressed the influence of power in shared basins (see Lee and Mitchell, 2010), but
more research is needed in identifying how provisions and/or implementation are
impacted by various power arrangements.
Third, the case study did not consider two external pressures on the water
agreements. First, Afghanistan is an upstream riparian who is absent from 1992 and 2008
Agreements, despite having potentially significant impact on water flows and allocation.
Afghanistan was typically not included in the literature on Central Asian water
governance, though regularly identified as a potential issue. Further research is needed on
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the impact of Afghan water use on Central Asian water agreements. Second, the case
study did not address the pressure of water infrastructure in context of the 1992 and 2008
Agreements. Infrastructure was thoroughly discussed in the conflict analysis, but only
discussed in generic terms of “development” within the agreements. More research is
needed to determine whether a provision addressing specific regional problems, such as
infrastructure in Central Asia, would positively impact the success of an agreement.

Implementation
From the case study analyses, implementation was identified as the likely cause of
Central Asian governance issues. As such, provisions guiding the implementation of an
agreement were not considered until after the research was complete. Such provisions
could have included research into mechanisms for jump-starting cooperation. Further
research is needed in determining whether a provision can directly influence the
implementation of the agreement, which could then influence the resiliency of a basin, or
whether implementation is inherently separate from, though dependent upon, an
agreement. If so, there may be additional procedural provisions to guide riparians in
ensuring that their agreement is implemented in a resilient manner resiliently.

Analyses Discussion: Conclusion
The preceding three sections examined the expected and unexpected findings,
determined that provisions failed to provide resiliency in the greater Aral Sea Basin, and
identified areas for further exploration pertaining to provisions, the case study, and
implementation. Overall, the conclusion is that expectations for provisions did not align
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with the findings of the research: the provision list was well represented between the
1992 and 2008 Agreements, yet failed to provide resiliency in Central Asian water
governance. Though there are possible critiques of the research, the outcome presented is
that implementation is as important, if not more important, to resiliency than treaty
content.

Rejected Hypothesis
The findings from the analysis of the 1992 and 2008 Agreements strongly suggest
that the hypothesis, which tied provisions to climate change resiliency, is rejected. The
provision list purported that the provisions would improve basin management despite
culture, geography, and political structures, and, when used in the majority, would
increase the resiliency of an agreement to withstand climate change. The hypothesis
further outlined resiliency theory as a worthwhile goal because of its positive
reorientation of climate change impacts.
However, in response to the elements of the hypothesis, the provision list has not
appeared to improve basin management in Central Asia. There is no reason to believe
that the provision list has harmed basin management, but it is evident that the impact of
the provision list is contingent upon successful implementation of an agreement.
Additionally, the entire provision list was represented between the two agreements, yet
the provision list did not appear to increase the resiliency of the agreements to withstand
climate change. Again, there is little reason to believe that the provision list negatively
impacted the resiliency of the agreements, but there is only fractured evidence that the
greater Aral Sea Basin is more resilient because of the provisions. So, to return to the
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question raised at the end of the Mexico-U.S. flexibility mechanism discussion, what is
the balance between articulating the perfect agreement and implementing resilient,
productive basin management?

Conclusion
There is little doubt that giant rifts in international treaties are coming: climate
change will impact preexisting water agreements as it forces changes in the hydrologic
cycle. Such shifts threaten to bring increased conflict over shared resources, as riparians
fail to adapt to new water circumstances. Addressing these eventualities will require
resiliency within transboundary water agreements. Yet, how to promote climate change
resiliency remains vague, at best.
The assumption that incorporating a specific array of provisions within a water
agreement to create mechanisms for adapting to climate change is not uncommon. This
thesis began by extracting provisions from the literature to propose a comprehensive
provision list, comprised of twenty provisions for enhancing cooperation and mitigating
conflict in a way that addressed the procedural, psychological, and substantive interests
of riparians. The hypothesis was that this provision list, when included in a water
agreement, would ensure climate change resiliency. However, the conclusion is that
provisions may promote resiliency, but do not ensure resiliency.
When the provision list was applied to the case study, this hypothesis was
rejected. The case study considered two of Central Asia’s water agreements, one from
1992 and the other from 2008. Central Asia is a region shaped by latent water conflict
stemming from historical legacies and horizontal inequalities, and also faces severe
99

climate change impacts due to its glacier-fed rivers. Through textual, syntactical, and
frequency analyses, the agreements revealed that the provision list is, overall, represented
in the two agreements. This prompted questions about the significance of the provision
list, and whether implementation of an agreement is more relevant to climate change
resiliency than the content of an agreement.
The initial hypothesis that climate change provisions promote resiliency was
ultimately rejected. Instead, two new questions were raised for future consideration. First,
what is the balance between articulating the perfect agreement and implementing
resilient, productive basin management? And, similarly, if the perfect agreement is
insufficient for creating climate change resiliency, what will?
To conclude, the importance of promoting strong, resilient agreements for
withstanding the pressures of climate change cannot be understated. As writer James
Cascio articulated, “Foresight turns out to be a critical adaptive strategy for times of great
stress” (Cascio, n.d.). Irrespective of how resiliency is implemented within water
governance, the intentionality to thrive despite the pressures of climate change provides a
forward-orientation for designing and guiding water agreements.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Timeline Highlighting Water Conflict in Central Asia

The Pacific Institute Water Conflict Chronology Timeline gives a picture of water
conflict and violence in Central Asia since the 1990s (World Water).
● The first record of violence over water was in the Ferghana Valley, in 1990,
which led to the death of 300 people on the Kyrgyz and Uzbek border.
● In 1997, 130,000 Uzbekistani troops guarded reservoirs between Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan cuts off 70% of water flowing to
Kazakhstan, which instigates a riot by Kazakh farmers.
● In 1999, Tajikistan flooded water from the Kairakum reservoir without giving
notice or consultation, in a move that resulted in significant cotton losses to
Kazakhstan farmers.
● In 1999, Kyrgyzstan halted flows to Kazakhstan for its failure to reciprocate coal
for water, as laid out in a previous agreement. A year later, in 2000, Uzbekistan
also cut off water to Kazakhstan for non-payment of debt.
● In 2001, Kyrgyzstan declares water a commodity and began charging its
downstream riparians for water. Reciprocally, Uzbekistan halts all natural gas
deliveries for Kyrgyzstan’s failure to comply with its reciprocal resource trade.
● In 2008, border disputations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lead to water
conflicts along the border. Tajik villagers crossed into a Kyrgyz district to remove
a dam, which later resulted in Kyrgyzstan blocking irrigation water to Tajikistan
in the growing season.
● In 2012, escalatory rhetoric over the proposal of dams in Central Asia heightens
discord over water. The Kambarata-1 dam in Kyrgyzstan and the Rogun Dam in
Tajikistan would impact water supplies for the downstream riparians.
Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov threatens that the dams could escalate
relations into wars, and resultantly cuts off natural gas deliveries to Tajikistan.
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● In 2013, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have a water dispute between villagers, in
which Kyrgyz villagers blocked irrigation water flowing to Kazakh farmers.
● In 2014, border forces from both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were injured over a
dispute regarding a small dam and electricity substation.
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Appendix B
The 2008 and 1992 Agreements
The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia, 2008, and the
Cooperation in the Field of Joint Water Resource Management and Conservation of
Interstate Sources, 1992, are attached for consultation of the agreements in the English
translation.
Statute of Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia
1.1. The Interstate Coordination Water Commission of Central Asia (ICWC) is created by
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan according to Agreement on co-operation in
shared management of international water resources use and protection adopted by Heads
of State on 18th February 1992 in Almaty.
1.2. By the decision of the Heads of State of Central Asia of March 26, 1992 and April 9,
1999 and the decision of IFAS Board of March 27, 2004, ICWC and its executive bodies
are annexed to the International Fund for Aral Sea Saving (IFAS) and rank as
international organizations.
1.3. ICWC in its activity is led by bi- and multilateral agreements between the StateFounders on water resources use from interstate sources, by Decisions of IFAS Board and
by the present Statute.
1.4. ICWC is a regional body of the Central Asian states to deal with joint solution of
issues related to shared water management, effective use and protection in the Aral Sea
basin and to implement of commonly elaborated programs following the principles of
collectivity and mutual respect of parties’ interests.
1.5. ICWC and its executive bodies implement a set of measures and procedures ensuring
equitable water allocation along the interstate sources, taking into account nature needs
and future development.
1.6. Any other state may join ICWC as a member or an observer upon consent of the
Governments of State-Founders.
II. Main objectives
The main objectives of ICWC are as follows:
2.1. Elaboration and implementation of a regional policy of efficient shared water use and
protection in order to meet social, economic and environmental needs of the StateFounders on equitable basis, as well as development and implementation of joint
programs for water supply improvement in shared basins in the region.
2.2. Shared water management in the Aral Sea basin by applying IWRM principles.
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2.3. Elaboration and approval of annual limits of water withdrawals from shared sources
for State-Founders and supervision over their observance; planning and control of large
interstate reservoirs operation regimes, water allocation management under actual flow
probability and water-economic situation.
2.4. Ensure annual releases for environmental protection and the Aral Sea and sanitary
releases along canals.
2.5. Development and implementation together with ICSD of regional environmental
programs related to the Aral Sea desiccation and water sources exhausting, including
catchment zone and wetlands.
2.6. Preparation of recommendations to the Governments of State-Founders on the
development of uniform pricing policy and possible losses compensation mechanisms
related to shared water and energy use, as well as on legal framework of shared water
use.
2.7. Coordination and control over implementation of joint research aimed at scientific
and engineering solution of regional water-related problems and of regional projects, with
the use of available scientific capacities of the State-Founders and implementation of the
results achieved.
2.8. Preparation of projects and initiation of work on improvement of active international
agreements in area of shared water management.
2.9. Render assistance to the Governments of State-Founders in cooperation with
international organizations and institutes.
2.10. Development and operation of unified regional, basin and national information
systems on water use, on dissemination and exchange of information related to water
resources and their use by the State-Founders.
2.11. Facilitation and coordination of relationships between the regional, national water
organizations and the regional, national hydrometeorological services; initiation of
regional programs and works on the improvement of monitoring system and hydrometric
provision.
2.12. Reconciliation of releases from reservoirs for irrigation needs with the Coordination
Dispatch Center “Energy”, with consideration of hydropower generation requirements, as
well as coordination of actions with national ministries and departments of Central Asia electric energy producers.
2.13. Facilitation of corporate affairs in developing and implementing water-conservation
technologies, advanced irrigation methods and technique, modern facilities for water
measurement and automation, in designing and developing general metrological system,
and accrediting metrological services and in other measures promoting better water use.
2.14. Elaboration of joint programs for prevention, early warning and liquidation of
consequences from emergencies and disasters related to operation of interstate
hydrostructures.
2.15. Establishment and development of a training system at national and regional levels
in order to increase skills of water-management organizations’ staff and of water users.
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2.16. Strengthen financial, material-technical and legal bases and scientific and
technological capacities of ICWC executive bodies.
2.17. Investigation of disputes and disagreements between shared water users; if
necessary, development of a procedure for creation of a special commission to establish
facts, as well as setting procedures for liabilities.
2.18. Investigation of notification by one of the Parties about construction of new water
structures impacting water regimes in shared waterways.
2.19. Elaboration of country proposals on construction, reconstruction and operation of
interstate water structures, with cost sharing among the Parties.
III. Structure and organizing the activities
3.1. ICWC members are comprised of leaders of national water ministries or departments
of State-Founders or of authorized representatives of country Governments.
3.2. ICWC meetings are held on a quarterly basis, by turns in each of State-Founders
under chairmanship of ICWC member of the respective state. The host-country bears
responsibility for timely approval of meeting dates and submission of agreed agenda to
ICWC members by executive bodies in due time.
3.3. Extraordinary ICWC meeting can be held upon initiative and with agreement of the
Parties.
3.4. ICWC’s decisions are made on consensus basis.
3.5. ICWC may make “Protocolar decision” on individual questions.
3.6. ICWC members, leaders of ICWC executive bodies and of international
organizations who have made considerable contribution to ICWC activities, would be
awarded a title of “ICWC Honorary Member” and a breastplate of standard form. The
ICWC Honorary members can participate in ICWC meeting and have a right of advisory
vote.
3.7. ICWC establishes its executive bodies for fulfillment of set tasks and provides
financing of their activities, as well as of approved programs and measures at expense of
State-Founders and, if necessary, changes duties of the executive bodies or ceases their
activities.
3.8. ICWC may crease special interstate investment funds for shared financing of work
related to regional water sector development and for fulfillment of other tasks as
mentioned in given Statute.
3.9. The costs of ICWC meetings on the spot are covered by the host-country.
3.10. The working language of ICWC is Russian.
IV. Rights and obligations
4.1. Annually ICWC approves water-withdrawal limits from shared water sources (for a
hydrological year with division into growing and non-growing periods) for StateFounders, with consideration of foreseen flow probability and established releases to the
Aral Sea and river deltas. ICWC makes decisions on water-withdrawal limits correction,
according to actual water situation.
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4.2. Based on actual water situation, ICWC permits to BWOs to make on-line waterwithdrawal corrections within the established limits, with notification of ICWC members.
4.3. ICWC considers and approves activity program of ICWC and its executive bodies
(plans of financing, capital investments, research, development and metrology, training
activity and other costs), work programs for preparation of draft interstate agreements,
international cooperation, for improvement of ICWC and its executive bodies, performs
control over work, financing and economic activities of executive bodies.
4.4. Decisions made by ICWC regarding regulation, use and protection of shared water
are obligatory for all water consumers and users, irrespective of their citizenship or
affiliation and ownership form.
4.5. The members ensure execution of ICWC’s decisions on territories of their respective
states.
4.6. Leaders, officials and staff of ICWC executive bodies, who have business trips to
State-Founders, can enter, leave and stay without visas on territories of these states no
more than 30 days provided that they have national passports, service certificates in form
approved by the Parties, and travel authorization.
V. Executive bodies
5.1. ICWC executive bodies include:
● Secretariat;
● Basin water organization “Amudarya” (BWO “Amudarya”);
● Basin water organization “Syrdarya” (BWO “Syrdarya”);
● Scientific Information Center for water related problems (SIC) and its national
branches;
● Coordination Metrological Center (CMC) and national organizations;
● Training Center (TC) and its branches.
5.2. ICWC may establish work groups for a certain period of time, with involvement of
other economic sectors, to solve individual thematic tasks.
5.3. ICWC Secretariat together with other executive bodies prepared agenda, measures
and draft decision for ICWC meetings and performs control over execution of ICWC
decisions and receipt of funds from State-Founders for financing of ICWC executive
bodies.
5.4. BWO “Amudarya” and BWO “Syrdarya” operate intake structures, waterworks
facilities, reservoirs and other interstate structures that are transferred to BWO’s
responsibilities for temporal operation, make estimates of water use in shared sources,
make proposals for setting water-withdrawal limits, depending on water availability in
sources for a planned period and ensure delivery of ICWC-set water limits in order to
supply with water economic sectors, population and environment in State-Founders.
5.5. On annual basis, BWO “Amudarya” and BWO “Syrdarya” prepare agreed proposals
on water releases for nature, Aral Sea and on sanitary releases along canals that should
not be used for other purposes. The heads of BWO “Amudarya” and BWO “Syrdarya”
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bear personal responsibility for execution of ICWC-set releases to the Aral Sea within the
zones of BWO jurisdictions.
5.6. SIC ICWC together with its branches prepares draft decisions and programs on
prospective development and implementation of a common regional water policy, on
improvement of shared water use and management, common water conservation
program, on environmental improvement in the basin, rationale and creation of
automated water management systems in river basins, on creation and operation of
common regional, basin and national information systems on water and land use;
develops draft interstate agreement on shared water management in the Aral Sea basin;
analyses water situation in the region and in the world and prepares proposals; upon
agreement with ICWC cooperates with international donors and funding agencies;
initiates and upon agreement with ICWC coordinates regional project implementation;
organizes and provides training activity; organizes and stuffs reference-information fund,
prepares and issues periodical and non-periodical publications. SIC ICWC undertakes
publishing activity by authority of ICWC.
5.7. CMC ICWC together with national metrological organizations coordinates
technological policy and its implementation in area of metrological provision of ICWC
programs and decisions on water use, protection and accounting in sources and water
systems; organizes joint preparation and use in practice of normative-technical basis of
metrological provision for water measurement, conducts integrated policy on water
accounting, measurement technologies, automation devices and facilities developed and
applied in water sector; organizes and performs work on accreditation, certification and
training in area of hydrometry.
5.8. TC ICWC together with its branches trains national water sectors’ higher and
medium level staff through training workshops on IWRM, national and international
water laws, irrigated agriculture and nature management improvement, etc. and ensures
equal representation of the region’s countries, prepares and publishes essential
courseware.
5.9. ICWC executive bodies are legal entities having their independent balances, stamps
with their titles in Russian and English, budget, settlement and other accounts. They act
according to Regulations (Statues) approved by ICWC.
5.10. The executive bodies may represent ICWC only after agreement by all ICWC
members.
5.11. Financing of ICWC executive bodies is made by the State-Founders:
● for upkeep of personnel and basic operations of an executive body; moreover, the
costs are shared proportionally to water withdrawals from interstate sources, with
obligatory consideration of all efforts made by the executive body on the territory
of given state;
● for research, development and metrological work – on the basis of ICWCapproved plan of this work, by each national water department of State-Founder
according to territorial affiliation, towards assignments to IFAS;
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financing of Secretariat’s activities is made by ICWC State-Founder, which hosts
the Secretariat, towards assignments to IFAS;
● financing of SIC ICWC’ national branch is made by the State-Founder, which
hosts given branch, towards assignments to IFAS.
5.12. The property of ICWC executive bodies (real estate, cars, machinery, equipment
and other material and technical values) is not subjected to privatization. Renting is made
only upon permission of ICWC.
●

VI. Order of rotation of the executive bodies and their heads
6.1. The heads of ICWC executive bodies are appointed, with determined term of office
and rotation order, and dismissed by ICWC decision.
Location of executive bodies and their redislocation (rotation) are determined by ICWC
decision.
6.2. Rotation of ICWC executive bodies is made according to the Provision about order
of rotation of executive bodies of the Interstate Coordination Water Commission (ICWC)
and their heads.
VII. Order of Statute change or activity cessation
7.1. The Statute of ICWC is reviewed and adopted at ICWC meeting. Changes and
amendment to the Statute are inserted in the same way.
7.2. ICWC ceases its activity according to decision of the Heads of State-Founder.
7.3. If ICWC ceases its activity, the property and jointly created assets, as well as
structures transmitted to BWOs for temporal operation will be transferred to StateFounders based on their belonging and according to established order of their creation.
7.4. This Statute enters into force since the date of its signature.
Done in the city of Almaty on 18th of September in 2008.
For the Republic of Kazakhstan

A. Ryabtsev

For the Kyrghiz Republic

B. Koshmatov

For the Republic of Tadjikistan

S. Yokubzod

For Turkmenistan

K. Ataliyev

For the Republic of Uzbekistan

Sh. Khamrayev

Accessed at: http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute4.htm
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The Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan hereinafter referred to as "the Parties",
● guided by the need for coordinated and organized solution of issues related to
joint management of interstate water resources and for further pursuing
coordinated policy in the interests of economic growth and raising living
standards;
● based on the historical community of people living in the republics, their equal
rights and responsibilities for ensuring rational use and protection of water
resources;
● recognizing interdependence and interconnection of interests of all the republics
in dealing with joint use of water resources according to the principles common
for the entire region and equitable regulation of their use;
● considering that only integration and joint coordination of actions will enable
favorable conditions to deal with socio-economic problems, mitigate and stabilize
ecological stress, which originated as a consequence of water resources
exhaustion, as well as taking into account that there is imbalance in irrigated land
availability per capita in the Republic of Tajikistan, and recognizing potential
increase of water supply for irrigated agriculture,
● respecting established structure and principles of water allocation and relying on
regulatory documents on allocation of water resources from interstate sources
currently in force;
● have agreed upon the following:
Article 1
While recognizing community and integrity of water resources in the region, the Parties
shall have equal rights to water use and responsibility to ensure rational use and
protection of water.
Article 2
The Parties shall ensure that the agreed procedure and established rules for water use and
protection are strictly observed.
Article 3
Each Party to the Agreement shall refrain from actions on their respective territories that
might affect interests of other contracting Parties and cause them harm, lead to deviation
from agreed volumes of water discharges and pollution of water sources.
Article 4
The Parties shall work together to address environmental problems resulted from drying
up of the Aral Sea and set amounts of sanitary water releases for every given year in view
of water content in interstate sources.
In case of extremely dry years, a special separate decision shall be made to supply water
for areas experiencing severe water scarcity.
Article 5
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The Parties will facilitate wide information exchange on scientific and technological
advances in the field of water management, integrated use and protection of water
resources [as well as promote] joint research to provide scientific and technological
inputs and expert appraisals of project plans of water management facilities and
economic assets.
Article 6
The Parties agree on joint use of productive potential of the republics’ water economy.
Article 7
The Parties decided to establish on a parity basis Interstate Commission for Water
Coordination to deal with the issues related to regulation, rational use and protection of
water resources from interstate sources, which would be comprised of the heads of water
agencies to meet quarterly and as the occasion requires - on the Parties’ initiative.
The Commission’s meetings are held by turns under the chairmanship of the host
country’s representative in the capital of this country.
Article 8
The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination is authorized to:
● determine water policy in the region, elaborate its key directions taking into
account all economic branches needs, integrated and rational use of water
resources, and long-term regional water supply program and measures for its
implementation;
● elaborate and approve annually water consumption quotas for each republic and
the region as a whole, schedules for reservoir operation regimes, their correction
according to revised forecasts, depending on actual flow probability and watereconomic situation.
Article 9
The executive and interministerial control bodies of the Interstate Commission for Water
Coordination are Basin Water Organizations "Syrdarya" and "Amudarya", which must
function under conditions that all structures along the rivers and water sources operated
by these organizations are the property of the republics and provisionally transferred [to
BWOs] without the right of disposal and redemption as of 1.01.1992.
The Basin Water Organizations are financed through allocation of national water
agencies on parity and shared basis.
Article 10
The Commission and its executive bodies shall ensure that:
● water releases regime and water use quotas are strictly observed;
● measures for rational water use and conservation, sanitary water releases along
the river channels and through irrigation systems (where appropriate), and
guaranteed water supply to river deltas and the Aral Sea with a view of
environmental enhancement and water quality maintenance, according to
achieved agreements, are implemented.
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Article 11
Decisions taken by the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination regarding
compliance with established water withdrawal quotas, rational water use and protection
are mandatory for all water consumers and users.
Article 12
The Parties agreed to elaborate within 1992 a mechanism of economic and other liability
for violation of the agreed water use regime and quotas.
Article 13
All disputes shall be settled by the heads of national water agencies, with involvement of
third party, if necessary.
Article 14
This Agreement can be amended or supplemented only through collective discussion by
all the Parties to the Agreement.
Article 15
This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signing.
The Agreement is signed in Alma-Ata on the 18th of February 1992.
For the Republic of Kazakhstan

N.Kipshakbayev

For the Kyrgyz Republic

M.Zulpuyev

For the Republic of Tajikistan

A.Nurov

For Turkmenistan

A.Ilamanov

For the Republic of Uzbekistan

R.Giniyatullin
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